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I. INTRODUCTION

A number of years ago, the board of directors of one of our
closely held, Minnesota-based corporate clients made the difficult
decision to terminate the chief executive officer of the company.
The CEO had founded this Internet technology company (let’s call
it “YouBetcha.com”) and still owned a substantial percentage of the
outstanding stock. YouBetcha.com had done numerous rounds of
† B.A., 1975, J.D., 1979, University of Minnesota. The author is a partner in
the Corporate Group of Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and
serves as the Director of Professional Development for that firm. The author is a
member of the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Business Law Section of the
American Bar Association. The Committee on Corporate Laws created and
maintains the Model Business Corporation Act. The views and opinions expressed
in this article are those of the author and not those of Dorsey & Whitney or the
ABA Committee on Corporate Laws. The author is indebted to William B. Payne
and Jay L. Swanson, partners of Dorsey & Whitney, for their helpful comments on
this article and to Michael J. Kroll and James K. Moeller, associates of that firm, for
their research assistance.
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venture capital financing and was now controlled by the venture
capitalists. Under the direction of the CEO, however, the company
had drifted sideways for years. It was not realizing its early promise
and seemed to be making no progress toward an initial public
offering or being bought out on terms attractive to the venture
capitalists. The company now faced a financial precipice. So, the
decision was finally made: the CEO has got to go.
Only a few days after the termination, one of my partners
received a letter from a well-known member of the Minnesota
corporate plaintiffs bar. He had been retained by the former CEO.
They were now claiming that the CEO’s termination had been
“unfairly prejudicial” under section 302A.751 of the Minnesota
1
Business Corporation Act and that the CEO’s shares must be
bought out by the corporation at an exorbitant price or a claim
would be filed immediately and a Minnesota court would surely
grant the CEO the requested buyout under section 302A.751.
Section 302A.751 of the Minnesota Business Corporation Act is
2
the darling of the Minnesota corporate plaintiffs bar. The section
has the ominous title: “Judicial intervention; equitable remedies or
dissolution.” This metastasized judicial dissolution statute gives
Minnesota courts explicit authority not only to dissolve Minnesota
corporations, but also to “grant any equitable relief they deem just
and reasonable in the circumstances” if a shareholder succeeds in
proving that “the directors or those in control . . . have acted in a
manner unfairly prejudicial” toward the shareholder in his or her
capacity as shareholder or director or, in the case of a closely held
1. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (2000).
2. Corporate plaintiffs bar members and their academic supporters
rhapsodize in their descriptions of the provision, portraying it as a miracle cure for
combating the pathologies of close corporate greed or as the slingshot in the
hands of little David as he squares off against management Goliaths. E.g., Joseph
Edward Olson, A Statutory Elixir for the Oppression Malady, 36 MERCER L. REV. 627
(1985) [hereinafter Olson, Elixir]; Joseph W. Anthony & Karlyn Vegoe Boraas,
Betrayed, Belittled . . . But Triumphant: Claims of Shareholders in Closely Held
Corporations, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1173 (1996) [hereinafter Anthony & Borass,
Betrayed]. For a brief description of the 1983 legislative amendments that gave
section 302A.751 most of the troublesome qualities it has today by the principal
author of the amendments, see Joseph Edward Olson, Statutory Changes Improve
Position of Minority Shareholders in Closely-Held Corporations, THE HENNEPIN LAWYER
(September-October 1983), at 10-11 [hereinafter Olson, Minority]. See also William
Z. Pentelovitch & Cynthia F. Gilbertson, Upholding Shareholders’ Interests: 20 Years
with the Minnesota Business Corporation Act, MINNESOTA BENCH & BAR, Oct. 2001, at
19; Deborah A. Schmedemann, Fired Employees and/or Frozen-Out Shareholders (An
Essay), 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1435, 1449 (1996).
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3

Minnesota corporation, as officer or employee.
In deciding
whether to order relief, the statute requires a court to consider the
4
For purposes of
“reasonable expectations” of shareholders.
section 302A.751, a shareholder’s reasonable expectations are not
necessarily bound by the terms of buy-sell or employment
5
agreements to which the shareholder is a party and are not
necessarily affected by a shareholder’s misconduct, even egregious
6
misconduct. In other words, section 302A.751 provides potential
statutory justification for a court to order a buyout on terms more
favorable than provided for in an existing buy-sell agreement to a
shareholder-employee who has been terminated for incompetence

3. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(1)(b)(3) (2000). The right to seek equitable
relief under the “unfairly prejudicial” standard of section 302A.751(1)(b)(3)
applies only to shareholders of a Minnesota corporation that is not “publicly held”
(defined in section 302A.011(40) as having a class of equity securities registered
pursuant to section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or being subject to
section 15(d) of such Act). To be actionable under section 302A.751(1)(b)(3),
the behavior must be “unfairly prejudicial” to the shareholder in his or her
capacity as shareholder or director unless the Minnesota corporation is also a
“closely held corporation” (defined in section 302A.011(6)(a) as a corporation
which does not have more than thirty-five shareholders), in which case the
behavior may be “unfairly prejudicial” to the shareholder in his or her capacity as
officer or employee as well as shareholder or director.
MINN. STAT.
§302A.751(1)(b)(3) (2000). For further discussion of section 302A.751, see infra
notes 145 - 223 and accompanying text.
4. MINN. STAT. §302A.751(3)(a) (2000) (“In determining whether to order
equitable relief, dissolution, or a buy-out, the court shall take into
consideration . . . the reasonable expectations of all shareholders as they exist at
the inception and develop during the course of the shareholders’ relationship
with the corporation and each other.”) For further discussion of the “reasonable
expectations” standard in section 302A.751, see infra notes 164 - 180 and
accompanying text.
5. The statute provides a presumption that written employment or buy-sell
agreements embody the shareholders’ reasonable expectations. MINN. STAT. §
302A.751(3a) (2000). But courts may override that presumption, see infra notes
186 - 212 and accompanying text, and the statute invites a court to do so if it finds
that “price or terms are unreasonable under all the circumstances of the case.”
MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(2).
6. See, e.g., Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994) (finding that a shareholder, director and officer who was removed as
director and officer following multiple criminal convictions for assault and
damage to property in the course of employment was entitled to section 302A.751
buy-out of shares at fair value without equitable reduction for misconduct).
Admitting that the plaintiff’s behavior in Pooley was “fairly egregious,” proponents
of section 302A.751 view the case as “a good example of the strong protections
that minority shareholders have been given.” Anthony & Borass, Betrayed, supra
note 2, at 1181. For further discussion, see infra notes 178 - 181 and
accompanying text.
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or even criminal misconduct in complete conformity with all other
law as well as any existing employment agreement.
Section 302A.751 is, in my view, one of the most potentially
disruptive provisions in all of U.S. corporate statutory law. It stands
as a monument to unpredictability and uncertainty.
My partner showed me the section 302A.751 demand letter.
He let me read it as he stood in front of my desk with a little hint of
a smile on his face.
“Ugh. What a mess!” I commiserated. “Just what a struggling
company needs: long, drawn-out litigation over an expensive
buyout of shares from the guy that ran the company into the
ground.”
My partner’s little smile broadened until his face was beaming.
He brought another piece of paper from behind his back and
handed it to me to read.
“Nope. I’ve already taken care of the whole thing with one
letter.”
I looked at the letter he handed me. It was addressed to the
well known corporate plaintiffs attorney. It had only one sentence:
“Responding to your recent letter, please be advised that
YouBetcha.com is a Delaware corporation.”
My partner took the rest of the day off. He had done a
tremendous day’s work for the shareholders and other
constituencies of our client. The real lawyering, however, had not
been done that day by writing the silver-bullet letter. It had been
done years before when he advised that YouBetcha.com should
incorporate in Delaware and not in Minnesota, in part to avoid the
unpredictability of section 302A.751.
Minnesota has become a poor choice for incorporation in
nearly all cases beyond that of a one-person, one-shareholder
incorporated proprietorship. That is a shame. Citizens of this state
have the right to expect that our state’s corporate laws embody a
flexible and balanced set of rules under which entrepreneurs and
investors can come together to establish and then realize their
reasonable expectations with the greatest possible predictability
and certainty. Making a business succeed is tough enough without
our corporate laws adding unnecessarily to the unpredictability and
uncertainty.
One reason lawyers frequently cite for incorporating a business
in Delaware instead of their own state is that Delaware courts have
produced extensive case law precedent interpreting Delaware’s
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corporation statute, the Delaware General Corporation Law (the
“DGCL”), and fleshing out the primarily non-statutory areas of
7
corporate governance law. Better definition may mean greater
predictability and certainty in the law. Minnesota certainly lacks a
comprehensive body of corporate case precedent, and that may be
8
a very important reason for preferring Delaware. But all states
other than Delaware have this same problem to a greater or lesser
extent.

7. “Corporate lawyers across the United States have praised the expertise of
the Court of Chancery, noting that since the turn of the century, it has handed
down thousands of opinions interpreting virtually every provision of Delaware’s
corporate law statute. No other state can make such a claim.” E. Norman Veasey,
An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisionmaking in Corporate Law, 53 BUS. LAW. 681,
682 (1998) (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist in William H. Rehnquist, The
Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of
Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351, 354 (1992)).
8. The absence of case law precedent under the Minnesota statute is
remarkable. According to a Westlaw search conducted on October 24, 2001
(“302A” and “corporation” in the MN-CS-ALL database), there were only 205
Minnesota Supreme Court, Minnesota Court of Appeals or federal court cases
citing chapter 302A in the twenty years since its adoption in 1981. Upon
examination, only 118 of these could be said to address substantive issues under
the MBCA, as opposed to simply citing the statute incidentally. Of those 118
substantive cases, a total of 46 addressed primarily issues under section 302A.751
(with 18 other cases dealing with Section 302A.751 but also addressing other
issues). That leaves only 72 cases decided by state or federal courts that have really
interpreted parts of the Minnesota statute (other than section 302A.751) or
otherwise addressed substantive, non-statutory aspects of Minnesota corporate law.
Although these 72 cases provide authority on a number of significant points that
should be relevant in choosing a corporate home, what they do not provide is even
more telling. Case law explaining the duty of care in Minnesota is scarce.
Although a number of cases refer to the existence of the business judgment rule in
Minnesota, there is little in the way of clear articulation of the rule. There are no
cases interpreting the practical scope of protection afforded by a Minnesota
charter option provision exculpating directors from liability for monetary damages
to the corporation and its shareholders. No cases have interpreted the meaning of
the “other constituencies” provision in section 302A.251. There is little authority
interpreting Minnesota’s indemnification provisions. It is unclear whether
Minnesota courts have adopted the Unocal, Revlon or Blasius standards articulated
by the Delaware courts. In fact, there is no clear Minnesota authority for the
proposition that Minnesota courts, when lacking their own authority, will
consistently follow Delaware’s lead. Case law interpreting important elements of
the merger and asset sale provisions relevant to M&A practice is almost
nonexistent.
There is almost no case authority interpreting the arcane
complexities of the various Minnesota anti-takeover statutes. Memorandum from
James K. Moeller, to Bryn R. Vaaler (Jan. 4, 2002) (on file with author);
Memorandum from Michael J. Kroll, to Bryn R. Vaaler (Nov. 11, 2001) (on file
with author).
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The problems that really set Minnesota apart relate to the
Minnesota Business Corporation Act, chapter 302A of the
Minnesota Statutes (the “MBCA” or “chapter 302A”). The MBCA
was adopted in 1981 and went into effect for all Minnesota business
9
corporations on January 1, 1984. Although based in large part on
10
the Model Business Corporation Act (the “Model Act”) as it
existed circa 1979, chapter 302A contained, from the start, an
eclectic mix of other disparate currents in corporate statutory law
11
as well as a number of home-grown novelties. In the two decades
9. MINN. STAT. § 302A.001 (2000); JOHN H. MATHESON & PHILIP S. GARON,
MINNESOTA CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE § 1.1, at 1-3 (1992).
10. The Model Act was developed by the Committee on Corporate Laws of
the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association and first published in
1950. The ongoing amendment and refinement of the Model Act is the
continuing job of the Committee on Corporate Laws. After nearly thirty years of
amendments, the Committee on Corporate Laws undertook a complete revision
and restatement of the Model Act. This task was completed in 1984 with the
publication of what became known as the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act. As the Revised Model Business Corporation Act became widely known and
adopted over the next six years, the Revised Model Business Corporation Act was
re-named simply the Model Business Corporation Act. Today, the Model Act is
the most influential source of corporate statutory law in the United States.
Approximately half of the states have adopted the Model Act more or less verbatim
as their corporation statute. As the Committee on Corporate Laws considers and
adopts further amendments and refinements, such changes are published in The
Business Lawyer in proposed and final form and are considered and acted upon by
legislatures throughout the country. See generally 1 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN.
xxvii-xxxix (3d ed. 2000); Richard A. Booth, A Chronology of the Evolution of the
MBCA, 56 BUS. LAW. 63 (2000). For a recent comparison of the Model Act and the
Delaware General Corporation Law, see Michael P. Dooley & Michael D.
Goldman, Some Comparisons between the Model Business Corporation Act and the
Delaware General Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 737 (2001). The Model Act is
published in its entirety along with the extensive Official Commentary and
annotations of case precedent drawn from states that have adopted the Model Act
in The Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, which is currently in its third
edition.
11. Advisory Task Force on Corporation Law Report to the Senate and
Preface to Reporter’s Notes reprinted in Reporter’s Notes to Section 302A.001,
WEST’S MINNESOTA CORPORATION, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, AND PARTNERSHIP
LAWS 62 (2001-2002 Special Pamphlet).
[P]ortions of the proposed new Minnesota Business Corporation Act
were derived from provisions [of the previous Minnesota act]. Most of
these provisions were rewritten in whole or in part for clarity and
consistency with other provisions in the proposed act. Other portions of
the proposed new business corporation act were similarly derived from
the Model Business Corporation Act and the business corporation laws of
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan,
New Jersey, and New York. However, other provisions in the proposed
new act have no counterpart elsewhere and represent innovations in
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since its adoption, more novelties have been added and little
attention has been paid to important changes and new directions
in U.S. corporate statutory law as embodied in ongoing
amendments to the Model Act. As a result, the idiosyncrasies of the
MBCA have become more and more exaggerated.
Today, I believe that the best advice Minnesota lawyers can
give their clients, whether their businesses are to be closely or
12
publicly held, is to avoid incorporating in Minnesota.
Minnesota deserves better than this. The MBCA should be
scrapped in its entirety. Years of inattention, fuzzy thinking, sloppy
drafting and bad choices have resulted in a statute that is really
beyond patchwork repair even by an informed and interested
legislature acting under the advice and close direction of an expert
and active corporate bar. Instead, Minnesota should do what
nearly half the states in the United States have done: adopt the
Model Act as it exists today in its entirety and commit to a
disciplined program of prompt consideration of, and action on,
future amendments and improvements to the Model Act with a
view toward keeping Minnesota in the mainstream of corporate
statutory law.
II. WHY THE MBCA SHOULD BE SCRAPPED
What makes the MBCA such a bad corporation statute? Here
are some of the reasons in no special order:

business corporation law.
Id. at 68-69. See also MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 1.1, at 1-3.
12. As noted, the only exception to this rule would be an incorporated sole
proprietorship in which there will never be more than one shareholder. If that is
the case, none of the problems with the MBCA (or for that matter any other state
corporate statute) really make much difference. The reason most often given for
incorporating a closely held business locally instead of in Delaware is cost: the cost
of maintaining a registered agent and office for service of process in Delaware, the
cost of foreign qualification in the home state of the business and the cost of
Delaware franchise and filing taxes. E.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: UNINCORPORATED BUSINESSES AND CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS §
8.17, at 213 (1996); WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS
th
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 143 (7 ed. 2000);
ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW §
1.08[A], at 13 (1999). With proper planning such as limiting the number of
authorized shares to avoid high franchise taxes, these additional costs can easily be
kept under $1,000 annually for most closely held corporations.
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A. Wrong-headed Defaults
A corporation statute consists of two kinds of provisions:
13
absolute rules and default rules. Absolute rules are invariable.
For example, the MBCA provides that owners of ten percent or
more of the outstanding shares of a corporation have the right to
call a special meeting of shareholders with or without the consent
14
of the board. This right may not be varied by providing to the
contrary in the articles of incorporation, the bylaws or otherwise.
Default rules may be varied by making provision in the articles
or certificate of incorporation, in the bylaws, by board resolution or
by contract, all as specified in the relevant corporation statute. For
example, the MBCA provides that shareholders take action by the
affirmative vote of a majority of the votes at a meeting at which a
quorum is present, unless the articles of incorporation provide for
15
a greater vote requirement.
Minnesota corporations may
therefore have super-majority voting by provision in their articles of
incorporation.
Big-ticket default rules may generally be varied only by
provision in the articles or certificate of incorporation. This makes
important default elections a matter of public record (since the
articles or certificate of incorporation, unlike bylaws, resolutions or
contracts, must be on file in the office of the Secretary of State or
other government official charged with oversight of corporations in
a particular state). It also makes such elections subject to change
16
only with both board and shareholder approval.
Two of the biggest-ticket default rules in the MBCA—the rules
on cumulative voting for directors and preemptive rights—are set
the wrong way. They provide by default for a rule that no
knowledgeable corporate lawyer would ever advise for his or her

13. JAMES D. COX, THOMAS LEE HAZEN & F. HODGE O’NEAL, CORPORATIONS §
3.10, at 3.29 to 3.30 (2001).
Under most corporate statutes, certain rules as to corporate organization,
meetings, and management are mandatory and cannot be varied by the
articles, while other rules apply only in the absence of some variation,
which must be stated in the articles (in some cases, the variation may be
in either the articles or the bylaws).
Id. (parenthetical included in original, footnotes omitted).
14. MINN. STAT. § 302A.433(1)(e) (2000).
15. MINN. STAT. § 302A.437(1) (2000).
16. For a description of the corporate charter as a sort of public contract
between and among the shareholders, the corporation and the state, see COX,
HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 3.11, at 3.30 to 3.32.
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client. For the uninitiated, this makes the MBCA a trap for the
unwary. For those who know better, this makes it necessary to
provide opt-out language in every single set of Minnesota articles
prepared. Every single one. Why would a corporation statute
provide a default rule that no knowledgeable practitioner would
ever leave as is?
Cumulative voting. The MBCA provides that shareholders of a
Minnesota corporation may vote cumulatively for election of
directors unless an opt-out provision is contained in the articles of
17
incorporation.
Under normal voting for directors, the holders of a majority of
the shares of voting stock of the corporation can elect the entire
18
board of directors. Cumulative voting is an alternative method of
voting for directors designed to give minority shareholders some
19
representation on the board. How many shares it takes to ensure
the ability, through cumulative voting, to elect one board member
turns on a complex formula dependent on the number of shares
present and voting, the number of board seats open for election
20
and other factors. Every time the number of outstanding shares
or the number of directors on the board changes, the minimum
number of shares required to elect one director also changes. In
order for minority shareholders to use cumulative voting to their
benefit, they must give timely notice of intent to vote cumulatively

17. MINN. STAT. § 302A.215(1) (2000). The default in favor of cumulative
voting was retained from the predecessor statute to the MBCA. Id. (Reporter’s
Notes - 1981, General Comment).
18. COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 13.21, at 13.45 (“Without
cumulative voting, holders of a bare majority of the shares may elect the full board
and thus control the corporation without any representatives of other interests
being present at board meetings.”).
19. “Cumulative voting is the privilege of multiplying the number of shares
held by the number of directors to be elected and casting the product for a single
candidate or distributing the product among two or more candidates.” Id.
20. Id.
The following algebraic formula is sometimes used to determine how
many votes of those present is sufficient under cumulative voting to elect
a specified number of directors:
x=a x b+1
c + 1
with a representing the number of directors [a shareholder] desires to
elect, b the number of shares present and voting, c the total number of
vacancies to be filled, and x the number of shares necessary to achieve
the desired objective.
Id. at 13.46 n.4.
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and must cumulate their votes in exactly the right manner,
21
otherwise it does not work.
For these reasons, no knowledgeable corporate lawyer ever
intentionally advises a client to build cumulative voting into the
corporation.
If the shareholders have agreed to minority
representation on the board, that result can be achieved with much
greater precision and certainty through use of multiple classes of
stock or voting agreements. If the shareholders have not agreed to
minority representation on the board, most people doing business
in corporate form would probably expect that the majority
22
shareholders can elect the entire board and would be, to put it
mildly, unpleasantly surprised to be bushwhacked by a minority
23
shareholder exercising statutory rights to cumulative voting.
The MBCA got it wrong by making cumulative voting an optout measure. The Delaware General Corporation Law and the
corporation statutes of most other jurisdictions make cumulative
24
25
So does the Model Act.
The
voting an opt-in provision.
reasoning offered for the Minnesota opt-out approach is stated in
the Reporter’s Notes to section 302A.215: “shareholders of a close
corporation would probably bargain for the inclusion of such a
26
provision in the articles.” What exactly does this mean? Does it
mean that shareholders of a Minnesota corporation would
probably have an unspoken expectation that there would be in
place an uncertain and unwieldy rule that would permit minority
shareholders at some constantly changing percentage level some
representation on the board? To me, that seems pretty unlikely
21. This is why most corporate statutes require advance notice (e.g., twentyfour or forty-eight hours) by any shareholder who intends to use cumulative
voting. Id. at 13.47. The Model Act, for example, requires forty-eight hours of
advance notice if cumulative voting is permitted. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28(d)
(2000). The MBCA has eliminated an advance notice requirement. See MINN.
STAT. § 302A.215 (2000) (Reporter’s Notes).
22. At least that has been the conclusion in most states, since cumulative
voting is an opt-in provision (i.e., no cumulative voting unless provided to the
contrary in the articles) in most jurisdictions. COX, HAZEN & O’NEIL, supra note
13, § 13.21, at 13.48.
23. Bushwhacked is the operative term in Minnesota. The twenty-four hour
advance notice requirement under the previous statute was eliminated in section
302A.215. MINN. STAT. § 302A.215 (2000) (Reporter’s Notes). All that is required
now is written notice to any officer before the meeting. Id.
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (2000). With respect to other jurisdictions,
see COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 13.21, at 13.48.
25. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28(b) (2000).
26. MINN. STAT. § 302A.215 (Reporter’s Notes).
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(and pretty bad legal policy). I think the far more likely
expectation (and far better legal policy) would be that minority
shareholders with a real expectation of ability to elect one or more
directors would want some certainty and predictability. That’s how
the drafters of the Model Act and the legislatures in most states see
it.
You may be saying: “Big deal. All you have to do is negate
27
cumulative voting in your articles.” That is basically true. But the
problem is that even good lawyers forget. When they realize their
mistake (for example, at the point when due diligence is being
done in connection with a financing transaction), they invariably
want to eliminate the problem as soon as possible. The MBCA
makes this very difficult. A minority shareholder with enough
shares to ensure election of one director under cumulative voting
can veto an amendment of the articles for the purpose of negating

27. Actually, in Minnesota, this is not quite true. The MBCA does not
explicitly state what the voting rule for election of directors is if cumulative voting
is eliminated. Compare MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28(a) (2000) (explicitly stating
that directors are elected by plurality vote unless otherwise provided in the articles
of incorporation) with MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.215 & 302A.437 (2000) (indicating
that election of directors would be subject to the basic majority-of-a-quorum voting
rule). This means that, in a Minnesota corporation opting out of cumulative
voting, directors must probably receive a majority vote to be duly elected and,
consequently, that all director seats open for election may not be filled.
MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 3.9, at 3-18 to 3-19. It is unlikely that an
articles or bylaw provision providing for plurality voting would be effective under
the MBCA, since section 302A.437(1) makes provision only for increasing
shareholder voting requirements, not decreasing them, in the articles. MINN.
STAT. § 302A.437(1) (2000). This is a perfect example of shoddy drafting in the
MBCA and a good illustration of why the whole statute should be scrapped. A
Minnesota corporation simply cannot achieve the full flexibility available under a
Model Act statute by negating cumulative voting!
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28

cumulative voting.
An amendment of Minnesota articles to
29
eliminate cumulative voting also triggers appraisal rights.
Preemptive rights. The MBCA also makes preemptive rights
an opt-out default. Section 302A.413 of the MBCA provides that
shareholders of a Minnesota corporation have preemptive rights
30
unless provided to the contrary in the articles of incorporation.
Statutory preemptive rights give each shareholder the right to
acquire a fraction of all new securities or rights to purchase
securities of the same type owned by the shareholder before the
31
corporation may offer such securities or rights to others. The
fraction is equal to the shareholder’s pro-rata ownership of the
32
securities of the relevant type before the proposed issuance.
There are important exemptions to Minnesota’s version of
statutory preemptive rights. For example, preemptive rights do not
apply to securities issued for consideration other than money or
33
issued in a merger transaction or issued in a public offering.
28. Section 302A.215(2) provides for this supermajority vote with respect to
any amendment to the “articles or bylaws which has the effect of denying, limiting
or modifying the right to cumulative voting for directors.” MINN. STAT. §
302A.215(2) (2000). Since cumulative voting can only be effectively negated in
the articles, it is clear from the reference to “bylaws” and from the “limiting or
modifying” language that the supermajority voting requirement is intended to
apply to adoption of other measures that could be viewed as lessening a
shareholder’s director election potential through cumulative voting. For example,
an articles amendment to classify the board or reduce board size would arguably
be subject to the supermajority vote in section 302A.215(2) if the Minnesota
corporation has cumulative voting. For an extensive discussion of the broad but
ambiguous reach of section 302A.215, see MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 3.8,
at 3-14 to 3-18.
29. Section 302A.471(1)(a)(4) triggers dissenter’s rights if an articles
amendment “excludes or limits” a shareholder’s right to cumulative voting. The
reach of this provision is as vague as the reach of the supermajority voting
requirement in section 302A.215(2). MINN. STAT. § 302A.471(1)(a)(4) (2000).
See MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 3.8, at 3-17. See also supra note 28. In
Whetstone v. Hossfeld Mfg. Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court confirmed that under
section 302A.471(1)(a)(4), dissenter’s rights are triggered in a closely held
Minnesota corporation with cumulative voting by an amendment to the articles
decreasing the maximum board size from five to three. 457 N.W.2d 380, 385
(Minn. 1990).
30. MINN. STAT. § 302A.413(1) (2000). See generally MATHESON & GARON,
supra note 9, §§ 5.9-5.11, at 5-32 to 5-37.
31. MINN. STAT. § 302A.413(2) (2000). See MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9,
§ 5.9, at 5-32.
32. MINN. STAT. § 302A.413(5) (2000). See MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9,
§ 5.9, at 5-34.
33. MINN. STAT. § 302A.413(4) (2000). See MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9,
§ 5.11, at 5-35 to 5-37.
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Once again, no knowledgeable lawyer would ever advise in
favor of statutory preemptive rights. If minority shareholders truly
have an expectation and agreement that they will be afforded the
opportunity to maintain their percentage ownership through a
right of refusal to acquire securities in subsequent issuances, that
expectation and agreement may be embodied with much greater
34
certainty and precision in an agreement with the corporation.
From the corporation’s standpoint, statutory preemptive rights may
interfere greatly with the ability to finance the corporate business.
For these reasons, the DGCL, the Model Act and the corporate
statutes in a majority of U.S. jurisdictions make preemptive rights
35
an opt-in provision. No preemptive rights exist unless explicitly so
provided in the certificate or articles of incorporation.
Once again, the MBCA provides a treacherous trap for the
unwary. I have seen even good Minnesota lawyers forget to negate
preemptive rights in the articles of incorporation. The results can
be absolutely devastating. The corporation may have existed and
financed itself without complying with the preemptive rights
requirements for years before the existence of the rights are
discovered. More than once in the course of performing a due
diligence review of a Minnesota corporation on behalf of an
investor group, we have discovered that preemptive rights exist and
have not been complied with. The corporation must then go to its
shareholders and beg them to waive their rights with respect to past
issuances and agree to amend the articles of incorporation to opt
out of statutory preemptive rights for the future. Any shareholder
so inclined can use this occasion to blackmail everyone else
involved by insisting on their pound of flesh with respect to prior
issuances. Removing preemptive rights for the future requires an
36
amendment to the articles of incorporation. Such an amendment
37
triggers appraisal rights.
34. Such agreements are explicitly authorized by section 302A.413(10) of the
MBCA, which provides that denial of statutory preemptive rights in the articles of
incorporation in no way limits the power of the corporation to grant any type of
contractual rights of first refusal.
MINN. STAT. § 302A.413(10) (2000).
Contractual rights of first refusal can also protect shareholders in ways that
statutory preemptive rights, with all their exemptions, cannot. COX, HAZEN &
O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 16.22, at 16.62.
35. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(3) (2000); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
6.30(b) (2000). With respect to the majority of U.S. jurisdictions being opt-in, see
COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 16.22, at 16.56; PINTO & BRANSON, supra
note 12, § 4.04[A], at 73.
36. If the corporation has cumulative voting, a minority shareholder with
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B. Misguided Policy Underpinnings
The wrong-headedness behind the Minnesota approach to
cumulative voting and to preemptive rights is the result, I believe,
of some fundamental philosophical or policy positions taken by
those who have been responsible for the MBCA. These positions
explain many of the worst problems in the statute.
Protecting “widows and orphans” as a first priority. First, the
MBCA is overly protective of minority shareholders. In a wellmeaning, but misguided, example of prairie populist thinking,
those responsible for the MBCA have somehow equated minority
shareholders to political, racial or religious minorities or other
segments of the population needing special protection. One of the
most active contributors to the minority protection provisions of
the MBCA, in an article on the 1983 amendments to the MBCA
aimed at stiffening minority protections, maintained that “the
38
classic victims” of shareholder abuse are “widows and orphans.”
The equation is questionable at best. Minority shareholders
generally do not become such by accident of birth or death but by
enough shares to ensure election of one director can veto an amendment of the
articles “which has the effect of denying, limiting, or modifying” preemptive rights.
MINN. STAT. § 302A.413(9) (2000). As originally added in the 1983 amendments
to the MBCA, this supermajority voting requirement applied even if the
corporation did not have cumulative voting. See MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9,
§ 5.9, at 5-33. This bizarre aberration was corrected in 1993 amendments to the
MBCA. However, even in a corporation that has cumulative voting, it is hard to
see a logical reason why elimination of preemptive rights should turn on a
cumulative-voting-based supermajority.
The principal author of the 1983
amendments offers no explanation of the logic beyond need to protect minority
shareholders. See Olson, Minority, supra note 2, at 25. Because the supermajority
requirement applies to any articles amendment having the “effect of denying,
limiting or modifying” preemptive rights, it has the same problems of vagueness of
reach as the supermajority requirement for elimination of cumulative voting
discussed supra in notes 28 and 29. See MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 5.9, at
5-33 n.119.
37. Section 302A.471(1)(a)(3) triggers dissenter’s rights if an articles
amendment “alters or abolishes” a shareholder’s preemptive rights. The reach of
this provision is as vague as the reach of the supermajority voting requirements in
sections 302A.215(2) and 302A.413(9) and the analogous dissenter’s rights trigger
for “excluding or limiting” cumulative voting. MINN. STAT. § 302A.471(1)(a)(3)
(2000). See supra notes 28, 29 & 36.
38. Olson, Elixir, supra note 2, at 629; Olson, Minority, supra note 2, at 10.
Although I have not done a close review of the dozens of cases decided under
section 302A.751 of the MBCA, I would bet that most of them do not involve
widows or orphans as plaintiffs. In fact, I would speculate that widows and
orphans are involved no more often than incompetent or unfaithful employees
and managers, quarrelsome siblings and convicted wrongdoers.
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volitional act and agreement. Although any corporation statute
must balance the good of the majority with the good of the
39
minority, the balance struck in the MBCA is substantially out of
line with the current mainstream of corporate statutory law.
Clarity, predictability and certainty as lesser priorities. The
MBCA seems consistently to undervalue clarity, predictability and
certainty. The nexus of contracts that comprises the law of
corporations is more complex than a purely contractual
relationship. Of necessity, it must include somewhat vague, extracontractual duties and rights (like the fiduciary obligations and
duty of fairness protecting minority shareholders from those
wielding power). However, the more our corporate law builds
vagueness, unpredictability and uncertainty into the nexus of
contracts and the more it vests the power to unleash that
vagueness, unpredictability and uncertainty in those who may have
a disproportionately small investment in the enterprise, the less
40
well it serves the enterprise and its economic goals.
39. “The history of the corporation evidences a tension between the impulse
to let people contract freely, and a concern for those harmed by such contracts.”
David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How
Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary
Responsibility and Securities Regulation for the Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L.
REV. 427, 433 (1998).
40. See infra notes 165 to 180 and accompanying text. In assessing the DGCL,
three practitioner-commentators have noted:
The Delaware bar and legislature have fashioned a statute that, for the
most part, fulfills the criteria for a good corporation statute: (i)
Technical flaws are eliminated quickly. (ii) Corporate transactions are
made easier to accomplish, successfully bypassing the idea that difficulty
is more moral. (iii) A large role is left to private contract through charter
amendment. (iv) There are few obstacles to majority rule.
Leo Herzel et al., Contents to Trouble, 42 BUS. LAW. 135, 135 (1986). The major
proponents of the minority shareholder “protections” in the MBCA obviously do
not agree with these criteria for a good statute. They have promoted minority
shareholder rights by intentionally inserting confusion and litigation-generating
ambiguity into the statute, all the while arguing that their intention is to simplify,
clarify and reduce wasteful litigation. For example, the principal author of the
1983 amendments to section 302A.751 apparently promoted those changes to the
legislature as a means of removing uncertainty and reducing litigation. Professor
Olson notes that “section 751 is designed to reduce litigation by removing
questions of law as obstacles to relief for noncontrolling shareholders. The law is
now clear – minority shareholders have a right to relief from ‘mistreatment’ that
exploits their vulnerability and defeats their reasonable expectations.” Olson,
Elixir, supra note 2, at 633. In a footnote to this statement, Professor Olson defines
what he means by “mistreatment:” it is “a general term that encompasses all acts
of the controlling group which leave other shareholders at a disadvantage.” Id. at
633 n.43. So, section 302A.751 in its present form was apparently sold to the
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Hardwiring it into the statute. The MBCA favors hardwiring
rules into the statute. The unmistakable direction of evolution in
corporate law (and in business association law generally) has been
away from the mandatory, structured, vested rights of the
shareholder and toward a more purely enabling, contractual
41
approach. Where a shareholder invests in an enterprise with little
or no explicit contractual specification, our corporate laws should
provide a nexus of contract that should have its default switches set
on relative simplicity, certainty, predictability and ability of the
majority to move forward with maximum flexibility. Minority
protections, where needed, should be as clear and crisp as possible.
Where a shareholder invests in an enterprise with more explicit
contractual specification (e.g., preferred stock, buy-sell
agreement), the rules of corporate law ought generally to yield to,
not override, the contractual specification.
legislature as a litigation-reducing cure for mistreatment of minority shareholders,
but was intended by its author to really be a no-fault right to recovery whenever a
minority shareholder is disappointed. The confusing language of section
302A.751 reflects this lack of clarity in purpose, and it is not surprising that this
litigation-reducing “elixir” has produced more litigation (judging from the
number of reported cases) than any other provision in the MBCA. See supra note
8.
41. “This movement toward enabling statutes has accelerated within the last
twenty-five years, as the contractarian view of corporations has gained more of a
following. As corporation statutes have become more enabling, there has been a
similar effect upon other business entity statutes.” Thomas F. Blackwell, The
Revolution Is Here: The Promise of a Unified Business Entity Code, 24 J. CORP. L. 333,
338 (1999). “Critics and advocates agree that a revolution, under the banner
‘nexus of contracts,’ has in the last decade swept the legal theory of the
corporation.” Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations:
A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1989). For
additional support for the contractarian evolution or revolution in corporate
statutory law, see COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 25.7, at 25.29; PINTO &
BRANSON, supra note 12, at 114; William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in
Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1395 (1993); Robert C. Clark,
Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1703, 1705 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contractual Freedom
in Corporate Law: Articles & Comments; The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1416 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1549 (1989); Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity
Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1994); Ralph K. Winter,
Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
251, 251 (1977). The Model Act recognized the importance of this contractarian
trend as it applies to privately held corporations in adopting section 7.32 in 1990.
Section 7.32 recognizes the validity of agreements among all shareholders of a
privately held corporation even though such agreements may be inconsistent with
one or more provisions of the Model Act, so long as such agreements are not
contrary to public policy. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32(a) (2000).
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The MBCA was written with too much power and uncertainty
vested in minority shareholders in ways that cannot be varied by
agreement among the participants to the corporate enterprise.
The wrong-headed defaults with respect to cumulative voting and
preemptive rights reflect all three of these problems. Cumulative
voting and preemptive rights are both, supposedly, minority
protective defaults.
They both entail such uncertainty and
unpredictability, however, that no one knowledgeable would ever
count on them to truly protect a minority shareholder, and no one
concerned with the majority’s ability to function efficiently would
ever knowingly permit them to remain the operative rules.
Nevertheless, cumulative voting and pre-emptive rights are baked
into the MBCA as opt-out defaults.
C. Onerous Class and Series Voting Requirements
All U.S. corporation statutes have provisions giving
outstanding shares of a class or series of stock mandatory voting
rights with respect to certain types of amendments to the articles or
certificate of incorporation even if the articles or certificate of
42
incorporation negates the right of such shares to vote.
Such
provisions are intended to give holders of a class or series a veto
power over amendments that would adversely affect their rights
even if such a voting power is denied in the terms of their class or
43
series.
The MBCA list of consequences requiring separate vote is
considerably more extensive than the Delaware list (ten items
44
versus three). Except in certain situations involving stock splits,
the MBCA requires a separate vote if the number of authorized
45
shares of the class or series would be increased or decreased. The
DGCL requires a separate vote on such increases or decreases
46
unless the certificate of incorporation denies it. Minnesota also
requires a separate vote if the amendment would, among other
things, effect an exchange or reclassification of the class or series,

42. COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 25.5, at 25.18.
43. Id.
44. Compare MINN. STAT. § 302A.137 (2000) with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
242(b)(2) (2000). See also COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 25.5, at 25.19
(“Delaware is distinctive in the brevity with which its statute proscribes
amendments triggering a class vote.”).
45. MINN. STAT. § 302A.137(a) (2000).
46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2000).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 4
02_VAALER

1382

5/23/2002 5:00 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:4

create a new class or series (or increase the authorized shares of an
existing class or series) with prior or superior rights or preferences
or change the rights or preferences of the class or series in any
47
way. Delaware requires a separate vote only if a change would
affect the rights or preferences of the class or series so as to affect
48
them adversely.
The MBCA class or series voting triggers are therefore more
numerous and substantially broader than their DGCL counterparts,
giving shareholders of classes or series that may constitute minority
participations in the corporation a veto power over important
changes that may go beyond any self-defense justification. The
result is a significant potential for obstructionism by minority
investors under the MBCA that may be troublesome for
management and majority investors.
The Model Act provides nearly as many triggers as the MBCA,
but has eliminated entirely the trigger for increases or decreases in
49
the aggregate number of authorized shares of the class or series.
So, if Minnesota follows the advice of this article and adopts the
Model Act as it currently exists, there will not be a huge
50
improvement in onerous class and series voting requirements.
However, the Model Act has been moving away from overloading
minority protections connected with articles amendments, as
shown by the important reduction in appraisal rights made to the
51
Model Act in 1999.
D. Expansive Appraisal Rights Provisions
All modern corporation statutes grant shareholders the right
to dissent from certain corporate actions and be paid in cash by the
47. MINN. STAT. § 302A.137(b)-(i) (2000).
48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2000).
49. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.04 (2000).
50. The Model Act does, however, lessen the potential for obstructionism by
requiring that classes or series that are similarly affected by an amendment must
vote together and not as separate classes or series. Id. § 10.04(c). For illustrations
of how this provision operates, see id. § 10.04 (Official Comment). The MBCA
does not have a comparable provision.
51. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business
Corporation Act Pertaining to Appraisal Rights and to Fundamental Changes – Final
Adoption, 55 BUS. LAW. 405, 405-406 (1999) [hereinafter Committee on Corporate
Laws, Changes in the Model Act]; Committee on Corporate Laws, Proposed Changes in
the Model Business Corporation Act—Appraisal Rights, 54 BUS. LAW. 209 (1998)
[hereinafter Committee on Corporate Laws, Proposed Changes in the Model Act]. See
also infra notes 62 through 66 and accompanying text.
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52

corporation the fair value of their shares. Dissenter’s rights of
appraisal were devised as a statutory escape valve for minority
investors. The majority can have flexibility in making fundamental
changes in the corporation and the terms of the investment
contract, but the minority shareholder can liquidate and escape if
53
they so choose. The Minnesota provision is substantially more
favorable to dissenting shareholders than the Delaware provision
for two major reasons:
Actions triggering appraisal rights. Delaware appraisal rights
only arise in the case of mergers or consolidations, and there is an
exclusion for any merger or consolidation in which the dissenter
owns shares traded on a national securities exchange or the Nasdaq
Stock Market and will receive publicly traded shares in the merger
54
or consolidation.
A much larger number of actions trigger
appraisal rights in Minnesota, namely, (1) a merger (with no
market exclusion comparable to the Delaware exclusion for
publicly traded shares); (2) a plan of exchange; (3) a sale of all or
substantially all of the assets of the corporation; and (4) any
amendment to the articles that materially and adversely affects the
rights or preferences of the dissenter’s shares by altering or
55
abolishing a preferential, redemption, preemptive or voting right.
Procedures for asserting appraisal rights. Under the DGCL, a
shareholder asserting appraisal rights does not receive any payment
for his or her shares until the court determines the fair value or the
parties otherwise agree to a value, which may require years of costly
56
discovery and litigation.
Costs of the proceeding may be
determined by the court and assessed against the parties as the
57
court deems equitable under the circumstances.

52. “Every state grants such rights upon the occurrence of certain mergers,
and most states also provide for dissenters’ rights in the event of a corporation’s
transfer of substantially all of its assets.” MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 7.22,
at 7-47. See also COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 22.24, at 22.72.
53. For a brief history of the development of appraisal rights statutes, see COX,
HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 22.24, at 22.72-22.80.
54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 262(a) - 262(b) (2000). See generally 1 R.
FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 9.43[B], at 9-89 to 9-92 (3d ed. Supp. 2001).
55. MINN. STAT. § 302A.471. “The MBCA dissenters’ rights provisions are
among the most liberal.” MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 7.22, at 7-47. See
generally id. § 7.22, at 7-47 to 7-51.
56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(i) (2000).
57. Id. at § 262(j).
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Under the MBCA, however, the dissenting shareholder is paid
up front the value of his or her shares as determined by the
58
The dissenting shareholder continues the
corporation.
proceeding only to recover the amount, if any, by which fair value
of his or her shares exceeds what has already been paid by the
59
corporation. Costs are assessed against the corporation unless the
court determines that the dissenting shareholder’s action in
seeking value above that paid up front by the corporation was
60
arbitrary, vexatious or not in good faith. In its discretion, the
court may also award attorneys’ fees to the lead dissenter from the
61
amount payable to all dissenters.
Important changes to Model Act not reflected in MBCA. Until
1999, the Model Act provisions were nearly identical to the MBCA
provisions both with respect to actions triggering appraisal rights
62
and procedures for asserting appraisal rights.
In that year,
however, the Model Act was amended to radically reduce the
triggering actions and bring the Model Act closer in line with the
63
Delaware provision and a contractual approach to corporate law.
Most importantly, the Model Act revision eliminated appraisal
rights resulting from any articles amendment (other than
amendments to effect a reverse stock split) and added a market out
64
similar to the Delaware market out. Although the 1999 revisions
to the Model Act retained appraisal rights in connection with
65
certain sales of corporate assets, such revisions were accompanied
by revisions to section 12.02 of the Model Act replacing the old “all

58. MINN. STAT. § 302A.473(5)(a) (2000). See generally MATHESON & GARON,
supra note 9, § 7.27, at 7-54 to 7-57.
59. MINN. STAT. § 302A.473(6) (2000). See generally MATHESON & GARON,
supra note 9, § 7.28, at 7-57.
60. MINN. STAT. § 302A.473(8) (2000). See generally MATHESON & GARON,
supra note 9, § 7.31, at 7-60 to 7-61.
61. MINN. STAT. § 302A.473(8).
62. Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Act, supra note 51, at
405-06; Committee on Corporate Laws, Proposed Changes in the Model Act, supra note
51, at 209.
63. Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Act, supra note 51, at
405-06; Commitee on Corporate Laws, Proposed Changes in the Model Act, supra note
51, at 209.
64. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a) (2000). For a closer description of the
1999 changes, see Historical Background to section 13.02 in 3 MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT ANN. 13-28 to 13-29 (3d ed. 2000); Bryn R. Vaaler, Major Revisions to the
Mississippi Business Corporation Act – Fundamental Changes and Appraisal Rights, MISS.
LAW., July-Aug.-Sept. 2000, at 28.
65. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a)(3) (2000).
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or substantially all” language with a more concrete safe-harbor test
intended to reduce the uncertainty involved in determining which
sales of corporate assets require a shareholder vote and trigger
66
appraisal rights.
The 1999 Model Act revisions also added a
specific provision that appraisal rights may be eliminated entirely
or restricted with respect to any class or series of preferred stock, if
such elimination or restriction is included in the terms of such class
67
or series.
As of the end of 2001, no initiatives had been undertaken in
Minnesota to bring the expansive appraisal rights provisions of the
MBCA into line with the 1999 revisions to the Model Act. As the
1999 revisions are adopted in more and more Model Act states, the
MBCA appraisal rights provisions will become even more
exaggeratedly out of line with the balancing of rights in
mainstream corporate law.
E. Unilateral Shareholder Approval of Articles Amendments
The Model Act and the DGCL require approval by both the
board of directors and the shareholders to amend the articles or
68
The
certificate of incorporation once stock has been issued.
MBCA also requires both board and shareholder approval for
amendments to the articles, but has a troubling exception to this
rule. If holders of shares aggregating 3% of the outstanding voting
power of the shares entitled to vote propose an articles amendment
66. Id. § 12.02(a). See also Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model
Business Corporation Act – Fundamental Changes, 54 Bus. Law. 685 (1999). For a
closer description of the 1999 changes to section 12.02 and discussion of the
uncertainty surrounding the old “all or substantially all” test, see MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 12.02 (Official Comment); Historical Background to section 12.02 in
3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 12-17 to 12-18 (3d ed. 2000):
As amended in 1999, section 12.02 represents an entirely different
statutory approach to defining asset dispositions that represent such a
fundamental change in the corporation’s business as to require
shareholder approval. As the Official Comment states, however, the basic
test employed in section 12.02(a) – whether the disposition “would leave
the corporation without a significant continuing business activity” – more
accurately captures the way in which many courts apply the “all or
substantially all assets” test used in other corporation statutes, including
section 12.02 of the Model Act, prior to the 1999 amendments. The
quantitative safe-harbor provision in the second sentence of 12.02(a) is
also unique to the Model Act, as amended.
Id. See also Vaaler, Major Revisions, supra note 64, at 28, 30 n.2.
67. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(c) (2000).
68. Id. § 10.03(b); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2000).
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in Minnesota, that proposal must be submitted to shareholders for
69
approval regardless of whether the board approves it. In essence,
this means that shareholders of a Minnesota corporation have the
unilateral ability (i.e., without board approval) to amend the
articles of incorporation if a proposal to do so is initiated by a
70
holder or holders or 3% of the outstanding stock. Although all
U.S. corporate statutes permit shareholders the unilateral ability to
adopt bylaw amendments, only a small minority of states permit
71
unilateral shareholder approval of articles amendments.
The ability of shareholders to restrict the residual authority of
directors to manage the business and affairs of the corporation
through binding, unilateral shareholder action in the form of
bylaw amendments has been a front-line corporate governance
72
issue for U.S. public companies in recent years. Although the
69. Section 302A.135(2) of the MBCA provides in pertinent part:
A resolution approved by the affirmative vote of a majority of the
directors present, or proposed by a shareholder or shareholders holding
three percent or more of the voting power of the shares entitled to vote,
that sets forth the proposed amendment shall be submitted to a vote at
the next regular or special meeting of the shareholders of which notice
has not yet been given but still can be timely given.
MINN. STAT. § 302A.135(2) (2000).
70. MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 2.19, at 2-34 to 2-37.
71. “All but 15 jurisdictions provide that the procedure for amending the
articles of incorporation is initiated by the board of directors adopting a resolution
setting forth the proposed amendment.” 3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 10.03, at
10-30 (3d ed. 2000) (Statutory Comparison). Of those that do not restrict
initiation to the board, some still require both board and shareholder approval for
effectiveness of the amendment. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.504(A)(2) (Michie
2000); CAL. CORP. CODE § 902(C) (West 2000); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 801 & 802
(McKinney 2000). Others are unclear on the required approvals. See, e.g., LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:31 (West 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, §§ 70, 71 & 72
(2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1611 (West 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.71 (Anderson 2000). Arizona permits shareholder initiation and unilateral
approval, but only if so provided in the articles of incorporation. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 10-1003(B) (2000). Pennsylvania permits shareholder initiation and unilateral
approval, but also permits an opting out of this right in the articles of
incorporation. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1912 (West 2000). South Carolina’s
provision permitting shareholder initiation and unilateral approval is applicable
only to corporations that are not publicly traded. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-10-103
(Law. Co-op. 2000). Only Colorado and North Dakota have clear and absolute
(no opt out possible) provisions like Minnesota’s permitting holders of a
designated percentage of shares (10% in Colorado; 5% in North Dakota) to
initiate an amendment to the articles that may be unilaterally approved by
shareholders. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-110-103 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-19
(2000).
72. For descriptions of the binding bylaw controversies, see generally John C.
Coates IV & Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generation Shareholder Bylaws: Post-Quickturn
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Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that such a restrictive bylaw
73
amendment is permitted under the Oklahoma statute,
notwithstanding language indicating that board authority may only
74
be restricted in the articles or certificate of incorporation, the
75
Delaware courts have not yet spoken clearly on the issue.
Alternatives, 56 BUS. LAW. 1323 (2001); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate
Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409
(1998); Kate Margolis, Binding Shareholder Bylaw Amendments: An Antidote for the
Poison Pill?, 67 MISS. L. J. 817 (1998).
73. See International Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Co. Inc., 975
P.2d 907, 908 (Okla. 1999).
74. At issue in Fleming, 975 P.2d at 908, was the legitimacy under the
Oklahoma statute of a bylaw proposed and adopted unilaterally by shareholders
that required the board to eliminate the Fleming shareholders rights plan or
poison pill and not to adopt another without shareholder approval. The relevant
provisions of the Oklahoma statute were nearly identical to the analogous
provisions in the DGCL. Coates & Faris, supra note 72, at 1329 n.27. On one
hand, the Oklahoma equivalent of section 141(a) of the DGCL, provides that
“[t]he business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under
the direction of a board of directors, except as maybe otherwise provided in this
chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2000)
(emphasis added). Section 157 of the DGCL adds further specification of the
board’s authority to adopt options and rights to issue stock, as in the case of a
poison pill. See Fleming, 975 P.2d at 910. On the other hand, the Oklahoma
equivalent of section 109 of the DGCL gives the stockholders explicit authority to
amend the bylaws unilaterally to contain any provision “not inconsistent with law
or with the certificate of incorporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b); accord
Fleming, 975 P.2d at 910. In essence, Fleming argued that the language in the
section 141(a) and 157 equivalents meant that the board could only be so
restricted in the certificate of incorporation and that a bylaw purporting to do so
was invalid. Fleming, 975 P.2d at 910. The Teamsters argued that, absent a clear
statutory mandate in favor of poison pills or a clearly contradictory provision in
the certificate of incorporation, the provisions equivalent to sections 141(a), 157
and 109 did not restrict the stockholders from adopting such a restrictive bylaw.
Id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed with the Teamsters and upheld the
legitimacy of binding stockholder bylaws under the Oklahoma statute so long as
there was not an explicitly contradictory provision in the certificate of
incorporation. Id. at 912. The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that its
interpretation might have been different if Oklahoma had a pill endorsement
statute of the type contained in the Model Act and in the corporation statutes of
many states. Id. at 912-13. See generally Hamermesh, supra note 72, at 421-25.
75. In Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics, Inc., 721 A.2d
1281 (Del. 1998), the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that a so-called “no-hand” or
“slow-hand” poison pill was invalid under section 141(a) of the DGCL because it
purports to restrain the authority of the board (to redeem a poison pill) outside
the certificate of incorporation:
One of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is that the board
of directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and
affairs of the corporation. Section 141(a) requires that any limitation on
the board’s authority be set out in the certificate of incorporation.
Id. at 1291. Some commentators have viewed Quickturn as indicating that
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Whether shareholders may act unilaterally to restrict the board
by binding bylaw amendments may be largely irrelevant in
Minnesota, since shareholders can clearly act unilaterally to amend
76
the articles.
Amendments to the MBCA in 1999 made a
backhanded effort to address this idiosyncrasy by purportedly
clarifying that unanimous shareholder approval would be required
for any unilateral shareholder amendment of the articles that has
77
the effect of restricting board authority. But it is unclear whether
Delaware courts would view binding stockholder bylaws as being invalid. E.g.,
Coates & Faris, supra note 72, at 1331 (“Attempts to distinguish the board’s actions
in Quickturn from shareholders’ action to adopt bylaws face long odds.”).
However, that precise issue was not before the court in Quickturn. See General
DataComm Indus., Inc. v. Wisconsin Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, 821-22 (Del. Ch.
1999) (indicating that Quickturn had not resolved the issue of validity under
Delaware law of binding anti-option-repricing bylaw proposal). In the last several
years, the corporate law validity of binding shareholder bylaw proposals has been
contested most frequently in no-action letter requests by corporate management
seeking to exclude such proposals from their proxy materials pursuant to SEC
Rule 14a-8(i)(1) (“not proper subject for action by shareholders” under applicable
state law) or SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(2) (“would, if implemented, cause the company to
violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject.”). 17 C.F.R. §§
240.14a-8(i)(1) & 240.14a-8(i)(2) (2001); see also Mark J. Loewenstein, Delaware as
Demon: Twenty-Five Years after Professor Cary’s Polemic, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 53236 (2000). Until recently, the SEC staff had generally refused to concur in
exclusion of such proposals under either Rule 14a-8(i)(1) or 14a-8(i)(2) on
grounds that the validity of such bylaws involves an “unsettled point of Delaware
law.” PLM Int’l Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 28, 1997). More recently, the
staff has concurred in exclusion of one such proposal in reliance on the opinion
of Delaware counsel based on Quickturn. See General Dynamics Corp., SEC NoAction Letter (Mar. 5, 2001).
76. The Minnesota equivalent of section 141(a) of the DGCL does not
directly refer to the articles of incorporation. Section 302A.201(1) provides in
pertinent part: “The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board, subject to the provisions of subdivision 2 and
section 302A.457.” MINN. STAT. § 302A.201(1) (2000). Subdivision 2 of section
302A.201 provides that “[t]he holders of the shares entitled to vote for directors of
the corporation may, by unanimous affirmative vote, take any action that this
chapter requires or permits the board to take.” Id. § 302A.201(2). Section
302A.457 provides for shareholder control agreements pursuant to which the
management structure of a Minnesota corporation may be customized by contract
signed by all shareholders. Id. § 302A.457.
77. The 1999 amendments to the MBCA came in part, no doubt, in response
to an attempted binding anti-pill bylaw proposal at one of Minnesota’s most well
known public companies, Dayton Hudson Corporation (which changed its name
in 2000 to Target Corporation). See Dayton Hudson Corp., SEC No-Action Letter
(Mar. 25, 1999); Target Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 3, 2000). The
proponent argued that the reasoning in Fleming should be followed even though
the MBCA contains a pill endorsement statute in section 302A.409(3). See supra
note 74. The company argued that the reasoning of the Delaware Supreme
Court’s Quickturn decision should instead be followed and that, in any case,
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a Minnesota court would read the amended provisions in this
78
restrictive a manner. Consequently, it remains to be seen whether
the balance of power between managements and shareholders at
public companies incorporated in Minnesota is set entirely
differently than at public companies incorporated in almost any
other state.
F. Who Can Call a Special Meeting of Shareholders
The default rule under Delaware law is that only the board of
79
directors can call a special meeting of shareholders. Section 228
of the DGCL permits shareholders to approve a measure by nonunanimous written consent without a meeting, but this right to
non-unanimous consent solicitation may be negated in the
80
certificate of incorporation. The certificates of incorporation of
well counseled Delaware public corporations contain a negation of
81
non-unanimous consent solicitations under section 228. So, in a
section 302A.201 indicated that any charter amendment – bylaw or articles –
pursuant to which the shareholders took action required or permitted to be taken
by the board must be adopted unanimously. See supra note 76. To bolster this last
argument, the legislature amended sections 302A.111(5) (optional provisions in
articles) and 302A.181(1) (bylaw amendments) in 1999 to make specific crossreference to section 302A.201. 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 85, art. 1. The intent of the
amendments, apparently, is to give greater force to the argument that the
unanimity requirement for shareholders to take action normally reserved to the
board in section 302A.201(2) is meant to cover the full range of all possible
restrictions on board activity imposed by shareholder action. A more natural
reading would be that shareholders in a closely held corporation, if they are going
to wholesale supplant the board’s management role in one or more areas, must do
so by unanimous action. The SEC staff permitted exclusion of the proposal in
1999 based on a technical glitch unrelated to the unanimity requirement. In
2000, the same proponent corrected the glitch and re-proposed. Although the
legislature had bolstered the unanimity argument in the 1999 amendment, the
company settled with the proponent before the SEC staff could resolve the dispute
over the validity of the proposal. In the settlement, Target Corporation agreed to
let its current pill expire in 2001 and not to adopt another pill without majority
approval by independent directors. Target Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 3,
2000).
78. Would a shareholder articles amendment that prevents the board from
adopting a poison pill or re-pricing an option constitute the taking of an action
that this chapter requires or permits the board to take within the meaning of
section 302A.201(2)? Is prevention of an action by the board the same as taking
an action? Would a Minnesota court find that the ambiguous language of sections
302A.201(2) would really prevent less than all shareholders from making any
charter amendment that somehow restricted the residual authority of the board?
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (2000).
80. Id. § 228(a).
81. See R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI, ET AL., MEETINGS OF STOCKHOLDERS 11-42 (3d ed.
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well-counseled Delaware corporation, a matter may be presented
for shareholder vote only with the cooperation of the board of
directors. This is an important point in the corporate governance
balance of power in public corporations. Hostile bidders must
unseat the board in order to put a matter to shareholder vote at a
special meeting, or they must present their proposals at the annual
82
meeting.
As already noted, the MBCA contains an absolute provision
giving the right to call a special meeting to shareholders possessing
83
10% of the outstanding voting power. The MBCA provides that
the ownership level increases to 25% (unless a lower threshold is
prescribed in the articles or bylaws) if the meeting is being called
“for the purpose of considering any action to directly or indirectly
facilitate or effect a business combination, including any action to
change or otherwise affect the composition of the board of
84
directors for that purpose.”
Since most state statutes give an absolute right to shareholders
85
at some percentage ownership level to call a special meeting, this
attribute of the MBCA is not an idiosyncrasy of Minnesota and
cannot in fairness be part of an indictment of the MBCA. In fact,
the inability of shareholders to call a special meeting is perhaps
more properly viewed as an idiosyncrasy of Delaware. But the
Minnesota 10% threshold is low and increases to 25% only if the
86
somewhat ambiguous “business combination” purpose test is met.
Supp. 2002) (“From management’s perspective, recent developments have
demonstrated the desirability of eliminating or restricting the right to act by
written consent.”); Herzel, supra note 40, at 142 (“Elimination of consents can
reasonably be considered a mild antitakeover measure, but, unlike other
antitakeover devices, it does not appear to encounter much (if any) resistance
from large stockholders.”). Cases in which the failure to negate non-unanimous
consent solicitation has had dire consequences are numerous. See generally Herzel,
supra note 40, at 138-42. Delaware courts reserve their most withering standard of
review for board actions found to be aimed primarily at impeding a shareholder
vote once underway. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch.
1988).
82. For discussion of the importance of eliminating the non-unanimous
consent procedure from the context of hostile bids for public companies, see
Herzel, supra note 40, at 138-42.
83. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
84. MINN. STAT. § 302A.433(1)(e) (2000).
85. COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 13.3, at 13.27.
86. It is almost guaranteed that, if the issue ever becomes important, the
ambiguity of the “business combination” purpose will be an issue in litigation as it
was in Banco Panamericano, Inc. v. Health Risk Mgmt., Inc., 78 F. Supp.2d 804 (N.D.
Ill. 1999). In that case, a party related to a hostile bidder attempted to call a
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Under the Model Act, the level may be increased in the articles of
incorporation to 25% without regard to the action to be taken at
87
the meeting.
I can certainly understand arguments in favor of permitting
shareholders to call special meetings. But the managements of our
public corporation clients generally want to retain the control
inherent in having the sole right to call such meetings. Although
the Delaware level of control may be used to further management
entrenchment in the face of hostile bidders or dissident
shareholders, it is tempered by the fiduciary obligations of
management under the enhanced scrutiny standards devised by the
88
Delaware courts.
The point is this: under Delaware law, my clients have the
option of retaining this control or permitting shareholders to call
special meetings or solicit non-unanimous consents. Under the
Model Act, my clients at least have greater leeway to increase the
required threshold. Under the MBCA, there is no option and no
leeway.
G. Limit on Bylaw Amendments
The Model Act, the DGCL and the MBCA all generally permit
either the board or the shareholders to amend the corporation’s
89
The MBCA has, however, a bothersome
bylaws unilaterally.
overlay of limitation on the board’s power. Section 302A.181(2)
provides:
After the adoption of the initial bylaws, the board shall
not adopt, amend, or repeal a bylaw fixing a quorum for
special meeting for shareholders to vote on removal of the company’s poison pill.
The federal district court certified to the Minnesota Supreme Court the question
of whether a meeting called by such a shareholder for such a purpose was subject
to the 10% or 25% threshold. Id. The case was settled before the Minnesota
Supreme Court could decide the issue.
87. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.02(a)(2) (2000).
88. Delaware courts reserve their most withering standard of review for board
actions found to be aimed primarily at impeding a shareholder vote once
underway. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988);
Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. CIV.A. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376
(Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000).
89. Under the Model Act and the MBCA, the board has the unilateral ability
to amend the bylaws as a default rule. MINN. STAT. § 302A.181(2) (2000); MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20 (b) (2000). Under the DGCL, an opt-in provision must be
included in the certificate of incorporation in order for the board to have this
ability. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2000).
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meetings of shareholders, prescribing procedures for
removing directors or filling vacancies in the board, or
fixing the number of directors or their classifications,
qualifications, or terms of office, but may adopt or amend
90
a bylaw to increase the number of directors.
This prohibition is not qualified by materiality of the change or by
its adverse effect on the rights of shareholders. It is just a
blunderbuss prohibition on any change, including – one must
assume – simple wording changes or typographical corrections
having no substantive effect on shareholder rights.
From a substantive standpoint, shareholders are relatively able
to protect themselves from truncation of their rights by unilateral
bylaw amendments by the board of directors. Under all U.S.
corporate statutes, the shareholders retain the right to change any
91
amendment effected by the board. Moreover, unilateral board
amendments to the bylaws truncating shareholder rights are
subject to enhanced scrutiny under the fiduciary duty
92
jurisprudence of the Delaware courts. So, it is hard to see why a
flat prohibition of this kind is needed or particularly helpful for
shareholders.
A scenario in which this prohibition proves bothersome occurs
regularly in my firm’s practice. A Minnesota corporate client hires
us after others have performed its organizational work. A review of
its bylaws reveals that they are not well put together, and the
corporation would be well advised to adopt a new set of bylaws in
one of our standard forms for Minnesota corporations. In other
states, this could be done as a matter of routine housekeeping by
the board of directors alone. In Minnesota, the limitation in
90. MINN. STAT. § 302A.181(2) (2000). See MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9,
at 2-45.
91. For all its shareholder and minority protection posturing, the MBCA is
less protective of shareholders with regard to bylaw amendments than the Model
Act. Shareholders have the right to override board amendments under both
section 10.20 of the Model Act and section 302A.181(2) of the MBCA. MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 302A.181(2) (2000). Under the
Model Act, shareholders may also lock in their change by providing that the board
may not amend, repeal or reinstate a bylaw that they have amended either in the
articles of incorporation or in the bylaws. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20 (b)(1)(2) (2000). Under the MBCA, such a lock-in must be contained in the articles of
incorporation. MINN. STAT. § 302A.181(2) (2000). This limitation has been used
by at least one Minnesota issuer to combat a binding bylaw proposal that included
a lock-in provision in the bylaw text. See Target Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr.
3, 2000).
92. See supra note 88.
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section 302A.181(2) almost certainly means that shareholders must
93
approve this essentially clerical change.
H. Overly Broad Control Share Acquisition Statute
If you like anti-takeover statutes, you will love Minnesota. We
have many more anti-takeover statutes than Delaware. Delaware
has a business combination statute (or third generation anti94
The MBCA has an
takeover statute) in DGCL section 203.
95
analogous business combination statute in section 302A.673.
93. Of course, this assumes that one is complying with the prohibition in
section 302A.181(2). How many times per year would you expect that bylaws are
amended in Minnesota without compliance with section 302A.181(2)?
94. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2000). Section 203 of the DGCL restricts
certain business combination transactions between a shareholder acquiring 15%
or more (designated as an “interested” shareholder) of the voting stock and any
Delaware corporation with securities traded on a national exchange, quoted on
the Nasdaq Stock Market or owned of record by at least 2,000 shareholders.
Unless an exception is available, the statute provides that for three years after the
15% threshold is exceeded, the corporation cannot have a merger, sale of
substantial assets, loan, substantial issuance of stock, plan of liquidation, or
reincorporation involving the interested shareholder or its affiliates. Shareholders
may opt out of section 203 at any time by majority vote, but the decision is not
effective for one year.
There are a number of important exceptions to the basic prohibition of
section 203. First, the Delaware statute does not prohibit a business combination
if, prior to becoming an interested shareholder, the board of directors has
approved the business combination or the transaction which resulted in the
shareholder passing the 15% threshold. Second, section 203 does not apply if the
interested shareholder acquires 85% of the target’s outstanding voting stock
(excluding shares held by management or held in employee benefit plans in
which the employees do not have a confidential right to vote) in the transaction in
which the 15% threshold is exceeded. Third, a business combination is
permissible if approved by the board and authorized at an annual or special
meeting of shareholders, and not by written consent, by the affirmative vote of
two-thirds of the outstanding shares held by disinterested shareholders. Finally, if
the target corporation, with the support of the majority of its continuing directors,
proposes at any time another merger or sale or does not oppose another tender
offer for at least 50% of its shares, the interested shareholder is released from the
three-year prohibition and free to compete with the target-supported transaction.
Id.
95. MINN. STAT. § 302A.673 (2000). Section 302A.673 of the MBCA is quite
similar to its Delaware analog, see supra note 94, except: (1) the interested
shareholder threshold is 10% rather than 15%; (2) the prohibition period for
business combinations is four years from the time the shareholder passes the
threshold instead of three years; and (3) there are no equivalents to the Delaware
exceptions for acquisition of 85% of voting stock, for two-thirds shareholder
approval at a shareholder meeting or for management approval of a competing
transaction or tender offer.
Section 302A.673 applies to “issuing public
corporations,” defined as any Minnesota corporation with at least 100
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Minnesota also has a control share acquisition statute (or second
96
generation anti-takeover statute) in section 302A.671, a so-called
97
“other constituencies” provision in section 302A.251 and a “fair
98
price” provision in section 302A.675 among other provisions
99
Delaware has no statutory
specially applicable to takeovers.
equivalents to these.
As a trap for the unwary, I believe the control share acquisition
statute is the real standout in Minnesota’s anti-takeover arsenal.
The statute requires approval by the disinterested shareholders of
any “control share acquisition” of stock of an “issuing public
corporation” (defined as any Minnesota corporation with at least
one hundred shareholders or with at least fifty shareholders if the
100
Minnesota corporation is a publicly held corporation).
A
shareholders (or with at least fifty shareholders if the Minnesota corporation is a
publicly held corporation). Issuing public corporations that are publicly held are
automatically subject to section 302A.673 of the MBCA unless they opt out by
charter amendment; issuing public corporations that are not publicly held are
subject to section 302A.673 only if they opt in by charter amendment. MATHESON
& GARON, supra note 9, §§ 8.14-8.20 at 8-28 to 8-44.
96. MINN. STAT. § 302A.671 (2000). See infra notes 100 to 114 and
accompanying text.
97. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(5) (2000). This section provides that:
In discharging the duties of the position of director, a director may, in
considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the interests of
the corporation’s employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors, the
economy of the state and nation, community and societal considerations,
and the long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and
its shareholders including the possibility that these interests may be best
served by the continued independence of the corporation.
Id. Although Minnesota courts have not interpreted the scope and effect of this
provision, it appears to afford the board substantial flexibility to give weight to
constituencies and to timeframes other than the shareholders and their
immediate value gains in deciding on a course of action in connection with
takeovers and otherwise. Delaware case law has indicated that such “other
constituencies” may normally be considered by the board, but that enhancing
value to shareholders should be the primary consideration in all cases and should
be the exclusive consideration in some cases, including sale of control of the
corporation. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 182 (Del. 1986); Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985).
98. MINN. STAT. § 302A.675 (2000). This section prohibits an offeror from
acquiring shares of a publicly held corporation within two years following a
takeover offer except upon terms equivalent to those of the earlier takeover offer,
unless approved by a committee of the board’s disinterested directors before the
takeover offer. MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, §§ 8.21-8.25, at 8-45 to 8-50.
99. See generally MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, §§ 8.26-8.51, at 8-51 to 8-88.
100. MINN. STAT. § 302A.671 (2000). The definition of “issuing public
Id. §
corporation” is contained in section 302A.011(39) of the MBCA.
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“control share acquisition” includes any acquisition of beneficial
ownership of shares that exceeds specified levels of voting power
(20%, 33-1/3% and 50%) of the outstanding stock of the target
101
“issuing public corporation.”
There are a number of important
exclusions intended primarily to distinguish hostile acquisitions
from transactions negotiated and approved by management and
shareholders, including exclusions for shares acquired (a) in a
102
merger, plan of exchange or sale of asset transaction, (b) directly
103
by purchase from the target issuer, (c) in a cash tender offer for
all outstanding shares if the offer has been approved in advance by
104
the board of directors of the target, and (d) by employee benefit
105
plans.
If the bidder fails to obtain the required shareholder approval
for a control share acquisition, the shares acquired (a) may not be
voted by the bidder beyond the 20% threshold level (or such
106
higher threshold level as shareholders have approved) and (b)
are subject to certain redemption rights at the option of the
107
target. The statute essentially requires the bidder to wage a proxy
contest to obtain the necessary approval and delays the acquiror’s
purchase up to fifty-five days while a special shareholders’ meeting
108
is held.
Although adopted by about half of the states in the United
109
States, control share acquisition acts are relatively ineffective and
110
of questionable value as anti-takeover statutes.
They were put
into place at a time when front-end loaded, two-tier takeover
structures were common and were intended to prevent such
coercive techniques from stampeding shareholders into a partial
302A.011(39). See generally MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, §§ 8.3-8.12 at 8-8 to
8-27.
101. MINN. STAT. § 302A.011(38) (2000).
102. Id. § 302A.011(38)(d).
103. Id. § 302A.011(38)(e).
104. Id. § 302A.011(38)(h)-(i).
105. Id. § 302A.011(38)(g).
106. MINN. STAT. § 302A.671(4)(a) (2000).
107. Id. § 302A.671(6).
108. Id. § 302A.671(3) (requirement that meeting to vote on control share
acquisition be held within fifty-five days of request).
109. See 1 MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS 528 n.7 (2001) (listing twenty-six states with such statutes).
110. For discussion of the reasons why the Delaware bar decided against
recommending adoption of a control share acquisition statute in that state, see
Lewis S. Black, Jr., Why Delaware is Wary of Anti-Takeover Law, WALL ST. J., July 10,
1987, at 18, col. 4.
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111

tender offer.
Even then, it was far from clear that the delays
required for a shareholder vote would necessarily stop a concerted
112
bidder. Many criticize the statutes as providing a ready means of
putting the company in play by forcing management into a
113
shareholder plebiscite that will very likely go against them.
Moreover, in an age of any-and-all-share tender offers, even if the
vote goes against the bidder, it may be to no avail. A hostile bidder
that has acquired at least 80.1% of the outstanding shares may still
be able to circumvent the effect of the act, since the bidder can
then outvote the 19.9% of outstanding shares remaining in other
hands, even if the right to vote were eliminated from the bidder’s
114
shares in excess of the 20% threshold.
The main problem with the Minnesota control share
acquisition statute is not its dubious value in the anti-takeover
context in which it was intended to operate – it is its over breadth
and extension into transactions far from the takeover context.
First, the statute applies to a “control share acquisition” even if it
has nothing to do with a hostile takeover. Second, the definition of
111. LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 109, at 5-28.
112. “The Delaware committee was . . . skeptical of the claim that the mere
existence of a 50-day wait would deter tender offers. The market’s usual creativity
in connection with takeovers has extended to financing matters.” Black, supra
note 110, at 18, col. 4.
113.
But wouldn’t the result be a stockholder plebiscite on every offer, and
wouldn’t the stockholder vote always favor the bidder or any new bidder
that offered a greater premium? . . . It seemed likely that institutions
would vote for a short-term profit. So would arbitragers who could
acquire shares before the record date for the stockholders meeting or
purchase shares with proxies attached. . . . Almost anyone who wants to
[put the company in play] or even to harass management, could simply
notify the company of his intention to make a control-share acquisition
and trigger the statutory stockholder plebiscite. The ensuing meeting,
notice and other publicity provide a cheap means to publicize the
company’s availability for sale.
Id.
114. This depends on the reading given to the term “voting power” in section
302A.671 and the term “entitled to vote” in sections 302A.443, 302A.437 and
elsewhere.
No published Minnesota case has decided the issue of whether such
shares acquired in a control share acquisition have “voting power” and
are “entitled to vote.” However, the possibility that an acquiring person
could acquire absolute voting control of a corporation without receiving
shareholder approval under the CSAA by acquiring more than 80% of its
voting stock clearly was not envisioned by the Minnesota legislature and
is contrary to the policy behind its adoption.
MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 8.11, at 8-26 to 8-27.
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“control share acquisition” (along with related definitions of
“acquiring person,” “beneficial owner” and “beneficial ownership”)
is incredibly vague and far-reaching.
It includes not only
acquisitions of target shares, but changes in organizational or
ownership structure of the owner of the shares. A reorganization
of the general partner of a limited partnership that owns a 21%
interest in a Minnesota “issuing public corporation” could
constitute a “control share acquisition” requiring approval by
disinterested shareholders.
Finally, unlike the Minnesota business combination statute
(which does not apply to issuing public corporations that are not
publicly held unless they opt in by charter amendment), the
Minnesota control share acquisition statute applies to all issuing
public corporations unless they opt out by charter amendment. An
incredibly broad range of transactions involving shares of nonpublic Minnesota corporations may therefore run afoul of the
statute in situations having nothing to do with the anti-takeover
purposes of the statute.
It is amazing how often the Minnesota Control Share
Acquisition Act poses impediments to routine transactions. Given
its dubious value as an anti-takeover statute and its potential for
mischief, my general advice to corporate clients is to opt out. But
its opt-out status is another trap for the unwary. I would bet that
the Minnesota control share acquisition act is triggered
unknowingly almost every day.
I would not mind seeing it repealed altogether. The Delaware
Legislature, after extended study by the bar, decided to adopt a
relatively balanced business combination statute and to pass on a
115
control share acquisition statute.
By contrast, Minnesota’s
control share acquisition statute was put into its present form and
most of the other Minnesota anti-takeover provisions were adopted
in a fevered special session of the Minnesota Legislature specially
called by the Minnesota Governor when a favorite publicly held
Minnesota corporation came under siege by an out-of-state

115. See Black, supra note 110, at 18, col. 4. See also Arthur Oesterle, Delaware’s
Takeover Statute: Of Chills, Pills, Standstills, and Who Gets Iced, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879,
880 (1988) (“[DGCL section 203] thus seems to represent a mid-course
compromise between those who view hostile takeovers as destructive and those
who view them as beneficial”).
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116

bidder.
Maybe the time has come to do some pruning in the
Minnesota anti-takeover bramble.
At a minimum, the Minnesota Control Share Acquisition Act
should be made an opt-in statute for Minnesota issuing public
corporations that are not publicly held.
I.

Unbridled Judicial Intervention

I taught Corporations in a state law school outside of
Minnesota for eleven years. The statutory supplement we used in
my class included the DGCL, the Model Act and selected excerpts
from other state corporation statutes representing alternative
approaches to common problems or unique or extremist
117
Section 302A.751 of the MBCA was included in our
provisions.
statutory supplement as an extremist example of statutory
118
authorization for court intervention.
Its notoriety is,
unfortunately, well deserved.
Dissolution statutes generally. All U.S. corporation statutes
119
have some type of voluntary or involuntary dissolution provision.
The provisions in the DGCL, MBCA and Model Act governing
voluntary dissolution by action of a majority of outstanding shares
120
are quite comparable. The provisions for involuntary dissolution
by court order in a proceeding initiated by a shareholder or a
121
creditor are very different.
Statutory provisions for involuntary dissolution provide an
essential escape mechanism for oppressed minority shareholders in
closely held corporations who have not provided themselves with a
116. See MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 8.1, at 8-5 n.1 (discussing Dayton
Hudson Corporation); Douglas J. Nill, Minnesota’s Corporate Takeover and Shareholder
Protection Act of 1987: Economic Folly or Constitutional Viability – Or Both?, 11 HAMLINE
L. REV. 281, 284-86 (1988).
117. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS:
STATUTES, RULES AND FORMS (eds. 1995-1999).
118. Id.
119. COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 26.2, at 26.4 & § 26.5, at 26.1226.17; Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders’ Reasonable
Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 200-11 (1988).
120. One major difference is that Minnesota is among a minority of states
permitting voluntary dissolution by shareholder action alone, whereas the DGCL
and Model Act require both board and shareholder approval. Compare DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 275–285 (2000) with MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.721-302A.7291 (2000) and
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 14.02-14.08 (2000). See also Thompson, supra note 119,
at 200 (“A few states exclude the board from the ‘gatekeeper’ function and permit
dissolution by action of the shareholders alone.”).
121. See infra notes 127 to 132 and accompanying text.
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contractual means of extracting the value of their investment and
122
Since a closely held corporation has no active trading
exiting.
market for its shares, a shareholder who wants to sell shares may
123
have little or no ability to find a buyer. A shareholder who has a
falling out with other shareholders in a closely held corporation
may find that the only market for his or her shares consists of those
other shareholders with whom he or she is at odds. The economic
pressure on an outcast shareholder in a closely held corporation
may be even greater if the outcast’s primary income is derived as an
124
employee of the corporation.
Putting contractual buy-sell mechanisms in place at the outset
is an essential part of closely held corporate planning and
organization and can help reduce the risk of hardship and
125
Buy-sell arrangements can provide for purchase of
disputes.
shares upon changes in circumstances such as death, disability or
126
termination of employment.
Even well conceived buy-sell
agreements may not, however, anticipate all problems arising from
a falling out among shareholder-participants.
The only general-purpose provision for involuntary dissolution
in the DGCL empowers the Court of Chancery to revoke or forfeit
the charter of any corporation for “abuse, misuse or nonuse of its
127
corporate powers, privileges or franchises.”
Delaware has a
special provision, however, for court-ordered dissolution in the
event of disagreement between the two shareholders of a Delaware
128
corporation that serves as a 50/50 joint venture. The DGCL also
permits the shareholders of a corporation electing to be treated as
a Delaware close corporation to provide in the charter for courtordered dissolution at the will of any shareholder or upon any
129
specified event or contingency. With careful planning, therefore,
122. Thompson, supra note 119, at 194–99. See also Anthony & Boraas,
Betrayed, supra note 2, at 1174-76; Olson, Elixir, supra note 2, at 627-29.
123. Thompson, supra note 119, at 196 (“In a close corporation setting, the
norm of free transferability of shares is illusory.”).
124. Id. at 197.
125. See generally HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEALS’S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS § 7.03, at 7-13 to 7-16 (2001).
126. Id.
127. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 284(a) (2000). See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra
note 54, § 10.24, at 10-58 to 10-59.
128. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 273 (2000). See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra
note 54, § 10.11, at 10-29 to 10-31.
129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 355 (2000). See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra
note 54, § 14.10, at 14-8.
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a Delaware close corporation can provide for dissolution as liberal
as in a partnership.
And, of course, contractual buy-sell
arrangements can provide desired exits for shareholders without
bringing dissolution into play at all.
The Model Act provision on involuntary dissolution in section
14.30 embodies the standard for current involuntary dissolution
130
provisions in U.S. corporate statutes. Section 14.30 provides that
a court has discretion to order the involuntary dissolution of the
corporation in a proceeding by a shareholder who establishes that
(1) the directors are in deadlock that cannot be broken by the
shareholders; (2) “the directors or those in control . . . have acted,
are acting or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive or
fraudulent;” (3) the shareholders are deadlocked and have been
unable to elect directors for at least two consecutive annual
meetings; or (4) “the corporate assets are being misapplied or
131
wasted.”
“Oppression” is the most frequently cited ground in
petitions for dissolution by minority shareholders who have not
132
provided for an exit strategy in a buy-sell agreement.
As many commentators have observed, courts have been
reluctant to dissolve a going concern even when faced with a clear
case of “oppression” of a minority shareholder without a
133
contractual exit strategy.
In most cases, such an oppressed
shareholder’s problems may be satisfactorily remedied by a buyout
at fair value of his or her shares instead of the dismantling of the
134
corporation. In fact, most dissolution proceedings actually result

130. Dooley & Goldman, supra note 10, at 747 (“The Model Act’s involuntary
dissolution remedy, section 14.30(2), is typical of like provisions found in most
state statutes.”).
131. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30(2)(i)-(iv) (2000).
132. Dooley & Goldman, supra note 10, at 747.
133. Id. at 748. See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (2000) (Official
Comment) (“If the petitioning shareholder proves one or more grounds under
section 14.30(2), he is entitled to some form of relief but many courts have
hesitated to award dissolution, the only form of relief explicitly provided, because
of its adverse effects on shareholders, employees, and others who may have an
interest in the continuation of the business.”).
134. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (2000) (Official Comment)
(“Commentators have observed that it is rarely necessary to dissolve the
corporation and liquidate its assets in order to provide relief: the rights of the
petitioning shareholder are fully protected by liquidating only his interest and
paying the fair value of his shares while permitting the remaining shareholders to
continue the business. In fact, it appears that most dissolution proceedings result
in a buyout of one or another of the disputants’ shares either pursuant to a
statutory buyout provision or a negotiated settlement.”).
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in a buyout of one or another of the parties involved either
135
pursuant to a statutory provision or a negotiated settlement.
Some courts have interpreted their states’ involuntary dissolution
statutes as implicitly including authority to order a buyout as a sort
136
of “alternative” remedy.
Other states have included explicit
authority in their dissolution statutes for courts to order a buyout as
137
a discretionary alternative remedy.
In 1990, the Model Act introduced new section 14.34 to
138
provide explicitly for a court-ordered shareholder buyout.
If a
shareholder files a petition for involuntary dissolution under
section 14.30, the corporation or one or more other shareholders
have ninety days under section 14.34 to file with the court an
139
irrevocable election to purchase the petitioner’s shares.
Once
the election is filed, the parties have sixty days to agree on a
140
If they fail to do so, the court must “determine
purchase price.
141
the fair value of the petitioner’s shares.”
The corporation then
has ten days to accept the court’s fair value determination or to file
142
for voluntary dissolution.
Section 14.34 does not alter the grounds upon which a
143
If the
shareholder may file for involuntary dissolution.
corporation and other shareholders believe the petitioner’s claims
of “oppression” are weak, they may choose not to make a buyout
election under section 14.34 and just fight out the action for
144
involuntary dissolution.
Section 14.34 authorizes neither the
court nor the petitioning shareholder to initiate the statutory
buyout; it is a purely optional, defensive response to the dissolution
petition that may be exercised by those most concerned with
145
continuation of the corporate business.

135. Id.
136. Thompson, supra note 119, at 194.
137. Id.
138. Historical Background to section 14.34 in 3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN.
14-154 to 14-155 (3d ed. 2000).
139. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34(a)-(b) (2000).
140. Id. § 14.34(c).
141. Id. § 14.34(d).
142. Id. § 14.34(g).
143. Bringing a claim alleging one of the grounds for dissolution under
section 14.30(2) is a prerequisite to applicability of Section 14.34. Id. § 14.34 cmt.
1.
144. Id. § 14.34 cmt. 2.
145. Id. (“The election to purchase is wholly voluntary.”).
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MBCA section 302A.751. Section 302A.751 is, at its base, an
involuntary dissolution statute very comparable to section 14.30 of
146
the Model Act. It has two very major differences.
First, section 302A.751 explicitly expands the court’s authority
beyond dissolution and empowers it also to “grant any equitable
147
relief it deems just and reasonable in the circumstances.”
The
146. Section 302A.751 was, in its original form, based largely on the
involuntary dissolution provisions of section 97 of the Model Act (the predecessor
to current section 14.30), although material from a New Jersey statute was fused to
the initial form of the statute as well. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (2000)
(Reporter’s Notes); MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 10.8, at 10-18 n.73. “The
only remedy explicitly mentioned in the predecessor statute [to section 302A.751]
was dissolution.” Id. at 10-18 n.76.
147. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(1) (2000). The principal author of the 1983
amendments to Section 302A.751, Professor Joseph Olson, lists “[a]t least fifteen
types of remedies . . . available to the court,” including:
(1) Cancelling, altering or enjoining any resolution or other act of the
corporation; (2) Directing or prohibiting any act of the corporation or of
shareholders, directors, officers or other persons party to the action; (3)
Canceling or altering any provision contained in the articles of
incorporation or by-laws of the corporation; (4) Removing from office
any director or officer, or ordering that a person be appointed a director
or officer; (5) Requiring an accounting with respect to any [business]
matters in dispute; (6) Appointing a custodian to manage the business
and affairs of the corporation; (7) Appointing a ‘special fiscal agent’ to
report to the court relating to the continued operation of the
corporation, as a protection to its minority stockholders, and the
retention of jurisdiction of the case by the court for that purpose; (8)
Retention of jurisdiction of the case by the court for the protection of the
minority stockholders without appointment of custodian [receiver] or
‘special fiscal agent’; (9) Appointing a provisional director who shall have
all the rights, powers, and duties of a duly elected director and shall serve
for the term and under the conditions established by the court; (10)
Awarding damages to any aggrieved party in addition to, or in lieu of, any
other relief granted; (11) Ordering the payment of dividends; (12)
Issuing an injunction to prohibit continuing acts of unfairly prejudicial
conduct; (13) Permitting minority stockholders to purchase additional
stock under conditions specified by the court; (14) Ordering dissolution
of the corporation at a specified date, to become effective only in the
event that the stockholders fail to resolve their differences prior to that
date; (15) Ordering that the corporation be liquidated and dissolved
unless either the corporation or one or more of the remaining
shareholders has purchased all of the shares of another shareholder at
their fair value by a designated date.
Olson, Elixir, supra note 2, at 643-45 (footnotes omitted). Section 302A.751 does
not explicitly limit remedies to those that operate on the corporation itself, and
the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently found authority in section 302A.751 to
impose on a majority shareholder personal liability for (1) damages relating to
corporate obligations to pay sales commissions to a terminated shareholderemployee as well as (2) buyout of the terminated shareholder-employee’s shares.
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statute goes on to specify the buyout remedy in actions involving
148
The court
Minnesota corporations that are not publicly held.
may order a buyout upon motion of either the corporation or any
shareholder, if the court finds a buyout “would be fair and
equitable to all parties under all of the circumstances of the
149
case.” The buyout is to be at the “fair value of the shares as of the
date of the commencement of the action or as of another date
150
If the shares in question are
found equitable by the court.”
subject to a buy-sell arrangement, the statute specifies that the
buyout shall be at the price and terms set forth in such
arrangement “unless the court determines that the price or terms
151
are unreasonable under all the circumstances of the case.”
Unlike sections 14.30 and 14.34 of the Model Act, therefore,
section 302A.751 empowers a court to employ a seemingly limitless
range of equitable remedies when a shareholder has proven one of
the grounds specified for relief. Unlike the Model Act provisions,
section 302A.751 explicitly vests the power to move for the buyout
remedy in either the corporation or any shareholder, including the
petitioning shareholder. Consequently, a buyout is not exclusively a
shield under the MBCA, it is also a sword in the hands of every
152
shareholder. Unlike the Model Act provisions, section 302A.751
explicitly authorizes a court to override an existing buy-sell
agreement in a buyout remedy based on the court’s secondguessing of reasonableness rather than any grounds under contract
153
law for finding the buy-sell agreement invalid or unenforceable.
See Billigmeier v. Concorde Mktg., Inc., C4-01-324 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2001)
discussed infra at notes 214 to 222 and accompanying text.
148. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (2000). “One particular remedy, the buy-out
of the complaining shareholder, is of such importance that it is spelled out in
some detail.” Olson, Elixir, supra note 2, at 645.
149. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (2000).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. The exclusively defensive availability of the buyout provision in section
14.34 was meant to provide a countervailing balance to section 14.30. Minority
shareholders with strong oppression claims will tend to be bought out; those with
weak claims will not. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 cmt. 2 (2000) (“These
provisions are intended to reduce the risk that either the dissolution proceeding
or the buyout election will be used for strategic purposes.”). Section 302A.751
does little or nothing to discourage “strategic” use of the buyout remedy and has
such vague and confusing grounds for granting a remedy that any terminated
shareholder-employee has little to lose by taking a parting shot.
153. The Official Comment to section 14.34 notes, however, that a court
should not be bound in fashioning a buyout remedy to the terms of a buy-sell
agreement if doing so would be “unjust or inequitable in light of the facts and
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Section 302A.751 also empowers a court to award reasonable
expenses, including attorneys’ fees and disbursements to any party
if the other party has acted “arbitrarily, vexatiously or otherwise not
154
in good faith.” Section 14.34 links fee and expense awards to the
strength of the petitioning shareholder’s underlying claim of
155
oppression.
The second major difference between the Model Act
provisions and section 302A.751, is that section 302A.751 adds a
new and incredibly vague ground for relief to the standard
repertory of deadlock, oppression, fraud, illegality and waste.
Section 302A.751(1)(b)(3) permits the grant of any remedy out of
the court’s equity arsenal if the shareholder proves “the directors
or those in control of the corporation have acted in a manner
unfairly prejudicial toward one or more shareholders in their
capacities as shareholders or directors of a corporation that is not a
publicly held corporation, or as officers or employees of a closely
156
held corporation.” Before the “unfairly prejudicial” language was
circumstances of the particular case.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 cmt 4(b)
(2000). The checks-and-balances built into sections 14.30 and 14.34 build in some
assurance that only those cases involving relatively meritorious claims of
oppression will proceed to the buyout phase. See supra note 152. Only in those
cases in which the corporation or other shareholders have elected the buyout
remedy would a buy-sell agreement be subjected to this second-guessing by the
court. Again, section 302A.751 offers none of these assurances. A terminated
shareholder-employee subject to a buy-sell agreement has little or nothing to lose
by petitioning the court to second-guess the terms of a buyout.
154. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(4) (2000) (“If the court finds that a party to a
proceeding brought under this section has acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or
otherwise not in good faith, it may in its discretion award reasonable expenses,
including attorneys’ fees and disbursements, to any of the other parties.”).
155. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34(e) (2000) (“If the court finds that the
petitioning shareholder had probable grounds for relief under paragraphs (ii) or
(iv) of section 14.30(2), it may award to the petitioning shareholder reasonable
fees and expenses of counsel and of any experts employed by him.”). This
provision once again helps ensure some balance in use of the buyout remedy. See
supra notes 152 & 153. A petitioning shareholder with a strong oppression claim
will be met by a buyout response, but will be eligible for a fee and expense award.
156. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(1)(b)(3) (2000). For discussion of the derivation
of the “unfairly prejudicial” standard by the principal author of the 1983
amendments that added this language to section 302A.751, see Olson, Elixir, supra
note 2, at 638-42.
The legislative intent was to lower the threshold for relief by eliminating
any need to establish a continuing course of abuse, to define the lower
threshold by using a term that has not been subjected to narrow judicial
interpretation, and to allow consideration of the injuries suffered by
shareholders other than solely as investors.
Id. at 638.
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added in 1983, section 302A.751 had authorized equitable relief if
“the directors or those in control of the corporation have been
guilty of fraud or mismanagement, or abuse of authority, or of
157
persistent unfairness toward minority shareholders.”
The
“unfairly prejudicial” standard in section 302A.751 was meant to
158
broaden these grounds to permit relief in a wider variety of cases.
Among other things, the new standard was intended to negate the
notion that there had to be anything “persistent” or repeated about
159
the unfairness. One instance is all it takes.
Section 302A.751(3)(a), also added in 1983, provides a court
with even more troubling “guidance” regarding when to order
relief in claims involving a closely held Minnesota corporation:
In determining whether to order equitable relief,
dissolution, or a buy-out, the court shall take into
consideration the duty which all shareholders in a closely
held corporation owe one another to act in an honest, fair
and reasonable manner in the operation of the
corporation and the reasonable expectations of all
shareholders as they exist at the inception and develop
during the course of the shareholders’ relationship with
160
the corporation and with each other.
According to one of the main proponents of the 1983
amendments, this language was intended to provide guidance to
161
Minnesota courts in applying the “unfairly prejudicial” standard.
It should be applied when there has been a “breach of the fiduciary
duty which shareholders owe to each other in the operation of the
corporation” (statutory recognition of the fiduciary duty of
157. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(1)(b)(2) (1982).
158. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (2000) (Reporter’s Notes – 1982-1984).
This is a more liberal rule than ‘persistently unfair,’ which required
repeated adverse results before a shareholder could sue. Now only one
instance is required. Moreover, the law now takes into account the
treatment of the shareholder in ways outside traditional shareholder
rights, i.e., the right to ownership. That is, it includes, for example, the
discharge of a shareholder-employee as a ground, if that discharge was
‘unfairly prejudicial.
Id. See also MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 10.11[b], at 10-25 to 10-26;
Anthony & Boraas, Betrayed, supra note 2, at 1177-78; Olson, Elixir, supra note 2, at
638-39; Pentelovich & Gilbertson, supra note 2, at 21.
159. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (2000) (Reporter’s Notes – 1982-1984); see also
Berreman v. West Publ’g Co., 615 N.W.2d 362, 373-74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that materiality is not an element of unfairly prejudicial conduct under
section 302A.751).
160. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(3a) (2000).
161. See Olson, Minority, supra note 2, at 17.
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shareholders in a closely held corporation being the intent behind
162
the “honest, fair and reasonable” language). And, “[i]n addition,
unfairly prejudicial conduct may be found if a shareholder’s
reasonable expectations with respect to his relationship to the
163
corporation are defeated.”
If the “unfairly prejudicial” standard were limited by
traditional notions of breach of fiduciary duty, it would be
164
troubling enough.
By making defeat of “reasonable
expectations” an alternative basis for finding an “unfairly
prejudicial” situation and ordering a buyout, the 1983 amendments
basically stunted further case law elucidation of the fiduciary duty
165
of shareholders for purposes of section 302A.751. Why should a
shareholder seeking relief under section 302A.751 try to prove
breach of fiduciary duty by those in control when he or she may
prevail simply by proving that things did not go according to his or
her reasonable expectations? The corporate plaintiffs bar went to
work.
Disturbing decisions.
Incredibly disturbing “reasonable
expectations” decisions under section 302A.751 began to
accumulate:
166
• Pedro v. Pedro. In Pedro v. Pedro, three brothers were
equal one-third shareholders in a family business and had worked
in the business for many years, all receiving the same benefits and
167
compensation.
In 1987, one of the brothers discovered alleged
discrepancies in the corporation’s financial records, and his
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. In Berreman v. West Publishing Co., the Minnesota Court of Appeals
affirmed that conduct insufficient to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty may
nevertheless be “unfairly prejudicial” within the meaning of section 302A.751. 615
N.W.2d 362, 374 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. &
Servs., 527 S.E.2d 371, 387-88 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000)). For discussion of the
derivation of the “reasonable expectations” grounds for minority relief in closely
held corporations, see Thompson, supra note 119, at 211-16.
165. In 1995, the Minnesota Court of Appeals narrowed significantly the
breadth of fiduciary breach claims that could serve as the basis for individual
actions under section 302A.751. In Skoglund v. Brady, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals held that a shareholder was required to show individual injury separate
from the injury to the corporation in order to sustain an individual claim for relief
under section 302A.751, otherwise the claim was derivative in nature. 541 N.W.2d
17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). See also Wessin v. Archives Corp., 592 N.W.2d 460, 465
(Minn. 1999) (affirming this aspect of Skoglund); Pentelovich & Gilbertson, supra
note 2, at 20-21.
166. 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
167. Id. at 799-800.
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relationship with his brothers disintegrated as he investigated the
168
The brothers eventually
discrepancies against their wishes.
terminated the investigating brother and bought back his shares
169
under an existing buy-sell agreement.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s award
to the disappointed brother-shareholder-employee of damages
equal to the difference between the fair value of his shares and the
price at which he had been required to sell them under the buy-sell
agreement, plus damages for breach of fiduciary duty and for lost
future wages for lifetime employment, plus attorneys’ fees,
170
expenses and prejudgment interest.
In doing so, the court
quoted from an article by a leading proponent of section 302A.751,
stating that “[t]he reasonable expectations of [a shareholder in a
closely held corporation, in addition to ownership interest,] are a
job, salary, a significant place in management, and economic
171
security for his family.”
172
• Sawyer v. Curt & Company. In Sawyer v. Curt & Company, a
CEO terminated by the board sued under section 302A.751. The
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the CEO’s “reasonable
expectations” under section 302A.751 were a continued “job, a
173
salary and a significant place in management.”
Consequently,
any termination of employment, even if perfectly legal and in
accordance with contract, defeated her expectations and required
a buyout without any further proof of “unfairly prejudicial”
174
conduct. The Sawyer court held:

168. Id.
169. Id. at 800.
170. Id. at 800-01.
171. Id. at 802 (quoting Olson, Elixir, supra note 2, at 629). The leading
commentators on the MBCA blamed the Pedro court for opening “a Pandora’s
box” by quoting these sweeping generalities by Professor Olson. MATHESON &
GARON, supra note 9, § 10.11[b], at 10-29 to 10-30. For a contemporary
excoriation of the Pedro decision and the effect it could have on established at-will
employment doctrine in Minnesota, see Sandra L. Schlafge, Comment, Pedro v.
Pedro: Consequences for Closely Held Corporations and the At-Will Doctrine in Minnesota,
76 MINN. L. REV. 1071 (1992).
172. No. C7-90-2040, C9-90-2041, 1991 WL 65320 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 12,
1991).
173. Id. at *2.
174. Id. at *2-3 (“It is undisputed respondent was terminated from her
employment without any proposal for compensation by appellants. This one
incident of unfairly prejudicial conduct is enough to justify the trial court’s grant
of the motion for a buy-out under [302A.751].”)
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We believe when those in control of a closely held
corporation terminate the employment of a moving
shareholder, a good faith effort must be made to buyout
the shareholder at a fair price or adjust the income
distribution mechanism to insure the shareholder an
equitable investment return. If this is not done, that is
sufficient evidence of unfairly prejudicial conduct by the
175
dominant corporation members.
Read literally, the Sawyer decision turns section 302A.751 into
an absolute right to a buyout remedy for any shareholder-employee
of a closely held corporation. If the terminated shareholderemployee is not offered a buyout at a value he or she likes, there
has been “unfairly prejudicial” treatment. In other words, the
failure to do what section 302A.751 requires you to do if the
shareholder-employee were to prove “unfairly prejudicial” conduct
176
is, itself, “unfairly prejudicial.”
The Sawyer case essentially
removes all meaning from the “unfairly prejudicial” standard and
177
reads it out of the statute.
175. Id. at *2.
176. Id. An Eighth Circuit panel, in McCallum v. Rosen’s Diversified, Inc., 153
F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 1998), followed the Sawyer rule, holding that a CEO who was
terminated in compliance with law and all agreements and then offered a buyout
at only a modest premium over current valuation, was by those actions alone
“unfairly prejudiced.” In the words of the court: “We simply hold that terminating
the CEO – as opposed to an employee that did not have a significant role in
management – and then offering to redeem his stock, which was issued partially to
lure him to remain at the company, constituted conduct toward McCallum as a
shareholder sufficient to invoke the requirements of the Minnesota Act.” Id. at
704. But see MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 10.11[b], at 10-32 (“Such a per se
rule probably was not intended by the legislature.”).
177. Sawyer, 1991 WL 65320, at *2. Creation of an absolute rule of
shareholder-employee buyout is certainly consistent with what the chief proponent
of the 1983 amendments to section 302A.751 intended to accomplish with the
reference to “reasonable expectations.” According to Professor Olson, the vague
term was intended to make it clear that a shareholder would always be entitled to a
buyout if events worked out to his or her disadvantage. As he put it: “Section 751
is designed to reduce litigation by removing questions of law as obstacles to relief
for non-controlling shareholders. The law is now clear – such shareholders have a
right to relief from ‘mistreatment’ which exploits their vulnerability and defeats
their reasonable expectations.” Olson, Minority, supra note 2, at 11. The
quotation marks around “mistreatment” were added by Professor Olson to
indicate that mistreatment does not really mean mistreatment, or as he explains in
a note “‘Mistreatment’ is a broad general term which emcompasses [sic] all acts of the
controlling group which leave the other shareholders at a disadvantage.” Id. at 11 n.24
(italics in original text). See also Olson, Elixir, supra note 2, at 633 (same tongue-incheek use of the word “mistreatment”). Both of Professor Olson’s articles on the
1983 amendments are full of words like “mistreatment” and “abuse” in the main
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178

• Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc. In Pooley, a minority
shareholder-employee was convicted of criminal assault and
criminal damage to property in the scope of his employment and
was terminated and voted out as an officer and director of the
179
corporation. The court of appeals affirmed that the shareholderemployee’s misconduct should have no impact on his reasonable
180
expectations under section 302A.751.
He was “unfairly
prejudiced” by his termination and should be bought out with no
equitable reduction in fair value resulting from his criminal
181
behavior.
Read together, these cases portray a chaotic, topsy-turvy world
in which an employee owning shares in a Minnesota closely held
corporation may be found to have an absolute right to lifetime
employment or a buyout of their shares at a price deemed fair and
reasonable by a court notwithstanding whatever buy-sell or
employment arrangements they may have agreed to before disputes
arose, notwithstanding an absence of truly oppressive conduct by
majority shareholders and notwithstanding whatever egregious
conduct on the part of the employee has led to his or her
termination of employment. Fundamental principles of contract
and employment law, rules that many would consider part of the
basic glue that holds a predictable commercial world together, are
subverted by section 302A.751 in favor of an unpredictable ad hoc
182
regime administered by Minnesota courts.
body of the text. Only by reading the footnotes does one understand what he was
attempting to accomplish. It is no wonder that section 302A.751 is the vague and
ambiguous nightmare that it is today. It is certainly far from clear that the
Minnesota Legislature understood his idiosyncratic semantics when it adopted the
1983 amendments. See also MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 10.11[b], at 10-32
(“Such a per se rule probably was not intended by the legislature.”).
178. 513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
179. Id. at 836.
180. Id. at 838.
181. Id.
182. According to Professor Olson, principal draftsman of the 1983
amendments that injected most of the chaos into section 302A.751, this was the
intent of the Minnesota Legislature: “The broad scope of [s]ection 751 reflects the
Legislature’s trust in the ability of the judiciary to achieve equitable results on the
facts appearing in individual cases.” Olson, Minority, supra note 2, at 11. Assuming
that was truly the understanding and intent of the legislature, the body of case law
resulting from the 1983 amendments indicates that the legislature’s trust was
misplaced. The principal commentators on the MBCA are charitable and
understated in their assessment: “The cases decided under [s]ection 302A.751
demonstrate the difficulty of establishing a doctrine under the ‘unfairly
prejudicial’ and ‘reasonable expectations’ standards that is both sufficiently
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1994 amendments: too little, too late? In part as a reaction to
cases like Pedro, Sawyer and Pooley, the Minnesota Legislature made
several amendments to section 302A.751 in 1994 intended to re183
Among
insert some balance and predictability into the chaos.
other things, the 1994 amendments added the word “all” into the
phrase “reasonable expectations of all shareholders” in section
302A.751(3a) to emphasize that it is not just the “reasonable
expectations” of the shareholder seeking the buyout that should be
184
considered.
So, a judge is supposed to take into consideration
the fact that other shareholders who have signed the same buy-sell
or employment agreement as the petitioning shareholder may have
a reasonable expectation that the terms of the agreement would be
respected or that a shareholder-employee convicted of criminal
activity in the course of employment could be terminated without
causing further damage to the corporation through an expensive
185
buyout. This was a subtle fix at best.
The 1994 amendments also added a presumption in favor of
written agreements to the end of section 302A.751(3a): “For
purposes of this section, any written agreements, including
employment agreements and buy-sell agreements, between or
among shareholders or between or among one or more
shareholders and the corporation are presumed to reflect the
parties’ reasonable expectations concerning matters dealt with in
186
the agreements.”
Consequently, it may now be somewhat more
likely that shareholders will actually get what they bargained for in
187
One cannot be
written agreements, but no guarantee exists.
flexible and sufficiently predictable.” MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, §
10.11[b], at 10-31 to 10-32.
183. 1994 Minn. Laws ch. 417, §§ 9-11.
184. Id. § 11. See also Anthony & Boraas, Betrayed, supra note 2, at 1179 (“The
reasonable expectations of both majority and minority shareholders should now
be examined by the court when determining whether to order equitable relief,
dissolution or a buy-out.”).
185. However, it may have had some salubrious effect on subsequent case law.
See Advanced Communication Design, Inc. v. Follett, 615 N.W.2d 285, 292-93
(Minn. 2000) (holding that fair value for purposes of section 302A.751 must be
determined based on fairness and equity to all shareholders, including
consideration of oppressive behavior by, and burden on, all shareholders). See also
Pentelovich & Gilbertson, supra note 2, at 23 (“Later decisions such as Follett,
emphasizing that the value should be fair and equitable to all the parties, may
prevent cases similar to Pooley in the future.”).
186. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(3a) (2000).
187. The plaintiffs bar has advertised that an arms-length negotiation
requirement should be read into the presumption, although no such requirement
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assured through even the most carefully drafted agreements that
the presumption will hold. What we needed was a clear opt-out
188
provision. Instead, we got a wishy-washy presumption.
Continuing Problems. Three very recent decisions, while
indicating a greater deference for written agreements, also
illustrate the continuing problems caused by section 302A.751:
189
• Drewitz v. Walser. In Drewitz, the general manager of a
BMW dealership negotiated an employment contract and buy-sell
agreement with his employer over a two-year period (he was
190
represented by counsel throughout the process).
The
employment contract was for a fixed-term with a right of earlier
191
The buy-sell
termination for cause (as defined in the contract).
agreement contained a buy-back right at book value upon any
192
After
termination of the general manager’s employment.
termination, Drewitz brought a claim under section 302A.751
seeking a buyout at fair value instead of book value based on
193
allegations of “unfairly prejudicial” treatment.
The trial court
dismissed his claims, reasoning in essence that his reasonable
expectations were bounded by the terms of his employment
appears in the statutory text. See Anthony & Boraas, Betrayed, supra note 2, at 117980 (“A shareholder may rebut the presumption that his or her reasonable
expectations are set forth in an agreement by demonstrating that the provision
regarding ‘expectations’ is ambiguous, being read out of context or not the
product of an arms-length negotiation.”). More recent cases may indicate that
Minnesota courts have adopted even more stringent requirements for the
presumption to hold. See infra notes 189 to 222 and accompanying text.
188. See Berreman v. West Publ’g Co., 615 N.W.2d 362, 374 (affirming that the
presumption in favor of written agreements may be rebutted based on
consideration of all the circumstances). Even the most ardent supporters of the
“reasonable expectations” school of minority relief have pointed out the dangers
inherent if there is insufficient deference to private ordering in a system of
corporate law:
A judicial role would not be attractive also if the parties by private
contracting could better resolve the dispute or if the possibility of later
judicial interference itself created uncertainties that increased the overall
costs of participating in a closely held enterprise. On the latter point, for
example, a potential majority shareholder investor (or a creditor) might
be reluctant to commit funds to an entity, or may seek a greater return
for doing so, because of a fear that the court would too easily force a
corporation to redeem a minority investment.
Thompson, supra note 119, at 224.
189. No. C3-00-1759, 2001 WL 436223 (Minn. Ct. App. May 1, 2001)
190. Id. at *1.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at *2.
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194

contract and buy-sell agreement.
The court of appeals affirmed,
citing the 1994 presumption language and pointing to the broad
integration clauses contained in both the employment contract and
buy-sell agreement (providing that these agreements “embody the
entire agreement and understanding among the parties relative to
the subject matter hereof and supersede all prior oral or written
agreements and understanding and shall be amended or modified
195
only by written instruments signed by all parties hereto”).
The Drewitz case is an encouraging development, but it leaves
many unanswered questions. How important was it that Drewitz
negotiated the terms of these agreements at length (as opposed to
196
signing a form agreement of his employer)? How important was
it that he was represented by counsel? Are good integration clauses
197
going to be the key in the future?
• Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Professionals, Inc.
Gunderson joined Alliance of Computer Professionals, Inc.
198
(“ACP”) in 1994 shortly after it was founded.
He had
199
responsibility for administrative and financial affairs. He had no
200
written employment contract. In 1997, all shareholders signed a
194. Id. at *4.
195. Id. at *2-4.
196. See supra note 187.
197. Including a reference to section 302A.751 in the integration clauses of
employment and buy-sell agreements used by Minnesota closely held corporations
may be advisable. Such a clause could read as follows:
Entire Agreement; modification, amendment and waiver.
This
agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding of the
parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and supercedes all prior
written or oral negotiations, agreements and understandings with respect
thereto. The terms and conditions of this agreement embody the full
extent of the parties’ reasonable expectations regarding the [buyout of
shares of the Company’s stock from Shareholder][employment of
Employee by the Company] for purposes of section 302A.751 of the
Minnesota Statutes or otherwise. In particular, and without limitation on
the foregoing, the parties represent and agree that [the Buy-Out Price
specified herein is reasonable and the result of arm’s length negotiation
between the parties][any investment in the Company by Employee shall
not create a reasonable expectation of continued employment][add
further specific representations and agreements] for purposes of section
302A.751 of the Minnesota Statutes or otherwise. This agreement may
not be modified or amended except in writing signed by both parties
hereto. No rights hereunder may be waived except in writing signed by
the party whose right is being so waived.
198. 628 N.W.2d 173, 179 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 182.
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buy-sell agreement that Gunderson had been primarily responsible
for drafting (including selection of the lawyer who provided him
201
The buy-sell agreement had a provision
with assistance).
designed by Gunderson for involuntary withdrawal of any
shareholder by a 75% vote of all outstanding shares with a formula
purchase price based in part on length of time the shareholder had
202
been at ACP.
In 1998, Gunderson was terminated amid
allegations of dishonesty, incompetence and spending too much
203
time on his own outside business. The board offered him $2,300
204
for his shares (based on the buy-sell purchase price). Gunderson
205
Gunderson
claimed the fair value of his shares was $1,133,000.
brought claims for breach of employment contract and for a
buyout at fair value under section 302A.751. The trial court
206
dismissed both claims on summary judgment.
Gunderson
appealed.
With respect to the employment claim, the court of appeals
affirmed, reasoning that Gunderson was an employee at will and
certain vague statements by management (he “would always be
taken care of” and “stick with me and I will make you rich when we
207
sell the company”) did not constitute an employment agreement.
With respect to the section 302A.751 claim, the court of appeals
agreed, citing the 1994 presumption, that buying Gunderson out
under the buy-sell agreement was not unfairly prejudicial to him as
208
a shareholder.
However, the court of appeals remanded the
201. Id. at 179-80.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 180.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 180-81.
207. Id. at 182-84.
208. Id. at 186. The court’s reasoning in deciding that the buy-sell agreement
did embody the reasonable expectations of the parties indicates that the
presumption in section 302A.751(3a) may have a high threshold if it is going to be
relied upon for summary disposition of a case:
The written agreement in this case specifically provided for the
involuntary removal of shareholders with or without cause. It also set
forth a method for valuing a departing shareholder’s stock, which
Gunderson proposed to ‘protect ACP if a partner [left] in a more or less
hostile manner.’ The agreement was an arm’s-length transaction.
Gunderson spearheaded it and actively participated in drafting it. In
fact, he proposed the very provision that authorized his involuntary
removal, and urged the board to adopt it. He also selected the attorney
who assisted the corporation in drafting the agreement.
Given
Gunderson’s immediate and significant involvement in the preparation
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302A.751 claim to the trial court for further findings of fact as to
whether, despite Gunderson’s employment at will, his termination
209
might have been “unfairly prejudicial” to him as an employee. In
the words of the court of appeals:
[E]ven though Gunderson was an at-will employee and,
therefore, not wrongfully discharged in the breach-ofcontract or tort sense, his employment termination
triggers a separate inquiry into whether ACP unfairly
prejudiced Gunderson in his capacity as a shareholderemployee.
The doctrine of employment-based
shareholder oppression is distinct from the wrongfultermination doctrine, and the analysis under the separate
doctrines should attempt to protect close-corporation
employment and, at the same time, respect the legitimate
210
sphere of the at-will rule.
The court of appeals indicated that this result could have been
different if Gunderson had had a written employment contract
along with a written buy-sell agreement defining his reasonable
211
expectations.
The court of appeals also indicated that
Gunderson’s reasonable expectations would not have been
defeated if the trial court found that his termination was indeed
212
the result of his misconduct or incompetence.
The deference for written agreements exhibited by the court
of appeals is encouraging in Gunderson. Again, however, it leaves
many questions unanswered.
How important was it that
Gunderson himself drafted the buy-sell agreements and designed
213
the purchase price formula?
The problem that Gunderson underscores with respect to
section 302A.751, however, is its incredible power to singlehandedly undermine entire bodies of law. For purposes of contract
law and employment law, Gunderson was an employee at will and

of the agreement, no rational factfinder could conclude that the
agreement did not reflect his reasonable expectations as a shareholder.
Id.
209. Id. at 193.
210. Id. at 190. The court of appeals cited in this regard Schmedemann, supra
note 2, at 1439-46.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 191.
213. See supra note 208. See also Pentelovich & Gilbertson, supra note 2, at 21
(“The Gunderson decision demonstrates that at the very least plaintiffs who actively
participate in preparing an agreement will have a difficult time convincing a court
that it does not reflect the parties’ reasonable expectations.”).
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entitled to no remedy. Termination of his employment, however,
could still entitle him to a section 302A.751 buyout. So, the
Gunderson court is outlining the rules of a new body of metaemployment and meta-contract law applicable to determine
whether a remedy is still available under section 302A.751.
214
• Billigmeier v. Concorde Marketing, Inc. In Billigmeier, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals demonstrated a frightening new
potential in the reach of section 302A.751 by using that provision as
authority to impose liability for corporate obligations personally on a
majority shareholder without any inquiry into traditional notions of
piercing the corporate veil, fraudulent conveyance or other similar
215
doctrine. In that case, the plaintiff owned one third of the stock
of Concorde Marketing and served as an officer, director and sales
216
representative. Following disputes over commission amounts due
217
to plaintiff, the plaintiff was terminated.
The plaintiff brought
suit under section 302A.751 for buyout of his shares and for
commission payments he claimed to be owing by Concord
Marketing. The trial court found that Concorde Marketing owed
the plaintiff nearly $281,000 plus statutory interest for unpaid
commissions and frustration of reasonable expectations of
continued employment and also ordered a buyout of his shares for
218
$93,312 plus statutory interest. Finding that Concorde Marketing
was unable to pay such amounts and that the majority shareholder
owed the company approximately $95,000 for advances, the trial
court ordered the majority shareholder to pay such amounts out of
219
The trial court reasoned that imposition of
his personal assets.
personal liability was permitted under section 302A.751 because
the majority shareholder’s termination of plaintiff and intentional
nonpayment of disputed commission amounts constituted “unfairly
220
prejudicial” treatment.
The trial court also found that valuation
of Concorde Marketing for purposes of determining the buyout
price should be as of the date of termination (not the date of
judgment) and should not take into account the amounts the court
found that Concorde Marketing then owed to the plaintiff as

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

No. C4-01-324, 2001 WL 1530356 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2001).
Id. at *5-6.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *4-6.
Id. at *6.
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221

commissions!
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court’s finding of facts and its frightening imposition of personal
222
liability on the majority shareholder.
What should be done? When the Minnesota Legislature
adopted the 1983 amendments to section 302A.751, they were
apparently concerned about enhancing protections against
oppression of minority shareholders. I cannot imagine that they
realized they were unleashing a provision that (1) would subvert
basic principles of corporate, contract and employment law in
closely held Minnesota corporations, (2) would be interpreted by at
least some courts as establishing an automatic or per se rule of
shareholder-employee buyout regardless of the behavior of those in
control or those seeking the buyout and (3) would serve as a basis
for imposition of personal liability on majority shareholders without
regard to traditional grounds for ignoring limited liability. I also
cannot imagine that they realized they were putting in place a
provision that would produce more litigation and more court
decisions than any other provision in the MBCA.
Few entrepreneurs who really understood the troubling
surprises and unexpected corporate (and, possibly, personal)
liabilities awaiting them under section 302A.751 would want to
incorporate in Minnesota. And if they did, they would never want
to issue stock to employees.
Section 302A.751 is intended to help protect those who form
closely held corporations in Minnesota without benefit of
223
competent counsel and adequate advance planning.
Those who

221. Id. at *6-7.
222. Citing the Pedro decision, the court of appeals made the case sound like
business as usual under section 302A.751:
In sum, the district court found that Billigmeier’s employment was
terminated when he had a reasonable expectation of continued
employment, that appellants intentionally withheld commissions owed to
Billigmeier, and that Willing withdrew money from Concorde Marketing
to fund his independent venture, Concorde Group. Those findings,
taken together, are sufficient to support the finding that appellants acted
in a manner unfairly prejudicial to Billigmeier . . . This court has
indicated that imposing personal liability is a permissibile form of
equitable relief under Minn. Stat. § 302A.751 [citing the broad remedial
language of the statute]. Moreover, imposing personal liability is
consistent with the broad statutory language of Minn. Stat. §
302A.751 . . . .
Id. at *6 (citations omitted).
223. See, e.g., Olson, Minority, supra note 2, at 12.
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do use competent counsel and engage in advance planning
should be able to opt out of section 302A.751’s special provisions in
the articles of incorporation and be governed by an ordinary
involuntary dissolution statute that does not interfere with basic
principles of corporate, contract and employment law. Even after
the 1994 amendments, the ability to “opt out” through written
agreements is far too uncertain and too costly.
Better yet, Minnesota should write this experiment off
completely and start over with the approach taken in the Model
Act.
III. CONCLUSION: THE MINNESOTA CORPORATE BAR
SHOULD TAKE CHARGE
I taught law school at a state university outside of Minnesota
for eleven years. During that time I had the privilege of being a
member of an advisory committee serving the secretary of state of
225
This committee, made up of prominent
my adopted state.
corporate lawyers, law professors from the two law schools in the
state and representatives of the secretary of state’s office, advises
the secretary of state and the legislature regarding reform
initiatives in the areas of business associations, securities and
226
commercial law.
The committee’s first major undertaking in
1987 (before I joined it) had been to repair the state’s business
corporation act which had become desperately out of date. After
extensive study, the committee concluded that they should
recommend adoption of the Model Act as it then existed in
224. Professor Olson indicates that a “fringe benefit” of the equitable remedy
provided by section 302A.751 may be to reduce the risk of malpractice liability for
lawyers who launch clients into closely held Minnesota corporations without
adequate planning in the form of buy-sell agreements and other contractual
mechanisms! Id. at 12 n.25. This observation indicates an unbelievable naïveté.
Section 302A.751 makes Minnesota a no-win jurisdiction for lawyers counseling
entrepreneurs at the time of formation of a closely held corporation. No amount
of planning will guarantee that buy-sell agreements and other contractual
mechanisms will be respected. I am sure that the last thing the lawyer who advised
a group of entrepreneurs at formation feels, when a minority shareholder hits the
jackpot under section 302A.751, is relief at the existence of section 302A.751. He
or she is going to be far more concerned with malpractice liability to the majority
shareholders for incorporating them in Minnesota in the first place without
adequately advising them of the uncertainties and potential liabilities that are
unavoidable under the MBCA.
225. See Bryn R. Vaaler, Revised Article 8 of the Mississippi UCC: Dealing Directly
with Indirect Holding, 66 MISS. L.J. 249, 250 n.1 (1996).
226. Id.
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essentially verbatim form and should strive to stay in that
mainstream by promptly considering and acting upon future
227
Their reasoning was that a state
amendments to the Model Act.
that was not in the commercial forefront and that already faced
many problems in attracting businesses and encouraging economic
development should at least have a corporate statute that was up-todate and that would have the benefit of ongoing maintenance and
228
improvement by the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws.
An additional advantage of adopting the Model Act is that it
comes complete with a substantial body of precedent and
commentary. The Model Business Corporation Act Annotated,
currently in its third edition, contains not only the extensive official
commentary for each Model Act section (which is maintained and
updated by the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws) but also
contains annotations of hundreds of relevant cases from Model Act
states in which courts have interpreted the various Model Act229
derived provisions.
The Model Act is also studied in basically
every law school in the country and has been extensively analyzed
230
in law review and professional commentary.
In my years on the secretary of state’s committee, we acted
231
We did
diligently on every amendment made to the Model Act.
227. E-mail from Daniel G. Hise, to Bryn R. Vaaler (Dec. 31, 2001) (on file
with author). Mr. Hise, a practicing corporate lawyer in Jackson, Mississippi, has
been a member of the Mississippi Secretary of State’s Business Law Advisory Group
since its inception and has served as chairman of the group. See also Robert W.
Hamilton, The Background of the New Mississippi Business Corporation Act, 12 MISS. C.
L. REV. 161, 162 (1991).
228. E-mail from Daniel G. Hise, supra note 227; see also Hamilton, supra note
227, at 177-78.
229. The Model Business Corporation Act Annotated also contains historical
background discussion of each section and statutory comparisons with provisions
in various states. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. passim.
230.
As of January 2000, it is cited 1026 times as the source of or authority for
current state statutes. It has been cited 453 times in state court opinions
(most often in Delaware), four times by the United States Supreme
Court, 53 times by the various United States Courts of Appeal (most
often by the Seventh Circuit), and 88 times by various United States
District Courts, Bankruptcy Courts, and the Tax Court. The Official
Commentary has been cited in 38 cases, and the Act itself has been cited
or discussed in 614 law review articles not including those appearing in
ABA journals.
Richard A. Booth, A Chronology of the Evolution of the MBCA, 56 BUS. LAW. 63, 63
(2000).
231. See James L. Robertson, The Law of Corporate Governance: Coming of Age in
Mississippi, 65 MISS. L.J. 477, 478 n.7 (1996) (noting annual updating efforts to
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not make every change made to the Model Act, but we considered
them all promptly and had what we thought were good reasons for
232
not making some of the changes. We had a very strong policy of
making the Model Act changes in order to keep our statute close to
the Model Act and within the mainstream of corporate statutory
law.
The secretary of state’s office did a remarkable job of
233
promoting our recommendations at the Legislature. In my years
on the committee, nearly every piece of legislation we
recommended was approved in essentially the form submitted by
234
our legislative sponsors.
We had great credibility among
235
legislators. Rarely did interest groups oppose our bills. On those
few occasions when they did, a benign compromise was quickly
236
reached.
If other states can adopt and maintain a corporate statute that
embodies the best in current corporate statutory thinking through
diligent work, trust and cooperation among the secretary of state’s
office, prominent members of the corporate bar, legal academics
and the legislature, why not Minnesota?
I do not know the answer. But I have my suspicions. I believe
the problem lies with the Minnesota corporate bar. The Minnesota
corporate bar has permitted corporate plaintiffs attorneys and law
professors too great a role in dictating Minnesota business
237
association law.
Front-line Minnesota corporate practitioners
maintain conformity to Model Act). For an account of one example of our
updating efforts, see Bryn R. Vaaler, Major Revisions, supra note 64, at 28.
232. For discussion of a Model Act change that we did not make, see Vaaler,
supra note 64, at 30 (discussing why we did not adopt section 6.21 of the Model
Act).
233. E-mail from Daniel G. Hise, supra note 227.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Where was the Minnesota corporate bar when the 1983 amendments were
made to section 302A.751? The law professor who was the primary author of the
amendments indicates that the corporate bar was asleep at the switch:
Although both the Chairman of the Advisory Task Force and the
Chairman of the Section on Corporate, Business, and Banking Law of the
bar association were notified of the pendency of the 1983 Amendments,
neither group opposed them prior to passage. The Task Force Chairman
made a number of suggestions, most notably that which led to the
inclusion of the ‘35 shareholder’ criteria for ‘close corporation.’ After
the 1983 Amendments had become law, the Executive Council of the
Corporate, Business, and Banking Law Section, rejecting a compromise,
proposed a bill to completely repeal the minority shareholder protective
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ought to take back our corporate statute. They ought to go to the
Secretary of State and to the Minnesota Legislature and convince
them that Minnesota has become a legal wasteland in the area of
corporate statutory law and that radical action is required to bring
it back in the mainstream.
This job should not be left to law professors. It must not be
thwarted by those who profit from the chaotic uncertainties of
section 302A.751. The Minnesota corporate lawyers who really
have a stake in the quality of the legal environment in which
Minnesota entrepreneurs operate must take charge.
The problem may be that knowledgeable Minnesota corporate
lawyers simply do not think it is worth the time and effort to
provide Minnesota with a corporate statute that is a reasonable
alternative to Delaware incorporation. They may simply find it
238
easier to incorporate their clients in Delaware.
I think that is a
shame. Minnesota deserves better.

provisions of the 1983 Amendments. At its legislative meeting on
February 25, 1984, the House of Delegates of the Minnesota State Bar
Association rejected the call for repeal. . . . The repeal bill was never
presented to the legislature.
Olson, Elixir, supra note 2, at 635 n.54.
238. See Loewenstein, supra note 75, at 504-05 (ease of incorporating clients in
Delaware takes away much of the incentive among corporate lawyers in other
states to promote local law reform).
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